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Postgraduate Legal Training: The
Case for Tax-Exempt Programs
Adam Chodorow and Philip Hackney
I. Introduction
The challenging job market for recent law school graduates has highlighted
a fact well-known to those familiar with legal education: A signiﬁcant gap
exists between what students learn in law school and what they need to
be practice-ready lawyers.1 Until recently, legal employers took on the task
of training graduates, whether through formal programs or one-on-one
mentoring. However, market pressures and budget constraints have led
many legal employers to eliminate or signiﬁcantly reduce the training they
used to supply.2 The resulting skills gap aﬀects the ability of young lawyers
Adam Chodorow is a Professor of Law and the Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research
Scholar at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona.
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1.

See, e.g., ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 137 (1953) (“all [law
schools] can be grouped under one heading, that the schools do not adequately prepare
students for the tasks they will have to perform in the practice.”); ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING
FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PRINCIPAL
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, WITH SOME
ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 281 (1921) (stating that “the failure of
modern American law school to make any adequate provision in its curriculum for practical
training constitutes a remarkable educational anomaly.”); Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical
Lawyer School?, 81 U. PENN. L. REV. 1907 (1933). As described more fully below, law schools
have made signiﬁcant strides in this regard over the past 50 years, but critics remain
dissatisﬁed. See, infra, sources cited in note 12.
The training gap is distinct from the question of whether law schools are producing too
many lawyers. Even if the number of graduates were perfectly matched to available jobs,
legal employers would complain that the graduates lacked the practical skills necessary
to be a lawyer. Addressing the supply-and-demand question is beyond the scope of this
Article.

2.

Neil J. Dilloﬀ, Law School Training: Bridging the Gap Between Legal Education and the Practice of Law, 24
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 431-33 (2013).
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to secure employment and advance in their careers, as well as the quality of
representation clients receive.
At the same time, many Americans simply cannot aﬀord to hire attorneys.3
The unmet need for high-quality, aﬀordable legal services aﬀects not only the
destitute and near-destitute, but also many in the middle class. The scope of
the problem is diﬃcult to gauge, but by some estimates poor people’s legal
needs go unmet up to eighty percent of the time and middle class people’s
legal needs go unmet up to sixty percent of the time.4 Insuﬃcient access to
aﬀordable legal services is bad not just for those who must do without, but
also for society as a whole. Among other disadvantages, lack of access to legal
advice undermines the rule of law and ﬂoods the courts with pro se litigants
who do not understand how the system works.
Over the past several years, a number of law schools have begun to
experiment with postgraduate training programs designed to address these
twin market failures.5 Such programs take many forms, but they typically
involve new lawyers working for paying clients at below-market rates under
the supervision of more-seasoned attorneys.6 In this way, new lawyers can
gain needed training and experience while providing legal services to those
currently unable to aﬀord lawyers. However, funding issues and tax law
considerations may stymie these training programs unless they are carefully
structured.
In this Article we consider a number of questions regarding how best to
structure postgraduate legal training programs to achieve these dual purposes.
In Parts II and III we make the case for postgraduate legal training as a good
3.

We focus here on civil representation and do not comment on the quantity or quality of
public defender services.

4.

See Emily A. Spieler, The Paradox of Access to Civil Justice: The “Glut” of New Lawyers and the Persistence
of Unmet Need, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 365, 369-76 (2013) (assessing the extent to which we can
measure unmet legal needs).

5.

For a listing of the schools that have implemented some form of postgraduate legal training,
see Incubator/Residency Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/program_main.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
The idea of law school-aﬃliated postgraduate training is not new. Rutgers considered
creating such a program in the late 1990s, but it never got oﬀ the ground. For a discussion
of that proposal, see Andrew J. Rothman, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practices: A Blueprint
for Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 875 (1999).
See also Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the
Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105 (2001) (focusing
on providing legal services to pro se litigants, but recognizing the training opportunities).
For a more recent exposition of this idea, see Bradley T. Borden & Robert J. Rhee, The Law
School Firm, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).

6.

Some law schools are paying recent graduates to do postgraduate internships at publicinterest employers. See, e.g., Liza Dee & Cory Weinberg, In Dim Job Market, Law School Pays
More Graduates to Work (Feb. 7, 2013), GW HATCHET, http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/07/
in-dim-job-market-law-school-pays-more-graduates-to-work/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
Participants get work experience and can build networks that might lead to jobs down the
road. Such programs are not self-sustaining and we do not address them here.
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way to address the skills and legal services gaps, and we consider program
design issues such as (1) whether law schools should take the lead in developing
these programs, (2) whether programs should operate as incubators for solo
practitioners or more like medical residency programs, and (3) whether they
should be housed within a law school or operated as separate entities.
We argue that, while other organizations could create such programs, law
schools should take the lead because they are in the best position to do so. Law
schools have signiﬁcant experience with clinical education that bears directly
on the training mission. Incubator programs require far fewer resources than
do full-blown residency programs, and schools must determine for themselves
which kind of program they prefer. Incubators ﬁt better within a law school
setting, while residency programs should probably be established as standalone entities.
In Part IV we turn to the important tax issues postgraduate training
programs raise. We begin by positing that tax exemption is important because
it will facilitate fundraising, may help attract clients, and could mollify the local
bar, which might view such programs as a threat. We then tackle the normative
question of whether such programs should qualify as charitable organizations
eligible for tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3). We do so because there is
no authority directly on point, and understanding the policy will shape the way
in which relevant authorities should be construed. We conclude that, while
postgraduate legal training programs may not look like traditional schools or
charities, they nonetheless are worthy of tax exemption because they address
the market failures that lead to the skills and legal services gaps.
We consider next whether such programs qualify for exemption under
current guidance. Programs operated within law schools will partake of their
host institutions’ tax-exempt status and should not aﬀect it, except in extreme
and unlikely circumstances. Stand-alone programs are more complicated
because they must apply for tax-exemption in their own right. Properly
designed postgraduate training programs should qualify under two diﬀerent
lines of authority. First, law school-aﬃliated programs can be granted an
exemption because they support the educational mission of their aﬃliated law
school. Second, programs should receive an exemption in their own right,
whether or not aﬃliated with a law school, because they serve an educational
purpose. The key issue is whether providing legal services to paying clients
constitutes an impermissible, non-exempt purpose.7 We argue that such
activities are permitted under both general guidance and the speciﬁc guidance
7.

Legal aid organizations that serve the poor are allowed to charge nominal fees based on
ability to pay, Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-2 C.B. 177, and this could arguably be a basis on which
tax exemption could be granted. However, given the need of most programs to charge
more than nominal fees, we do not believe that relief of the poor and distressed is likely
to be an independent basis to make a claim for exemption in most cases. Reaching out to
underserved communities may help distinguish the program from for-proﬁt organizations,
but pursuing that as the basis is likely to fail in most cases under current law. Whether lowbono services should warrant a tax exemption is beyond the scope of this Article.
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addressing on-the-job training. We oﬀer a model program that should ﬁt
within existing guidance and call on the IRS to issue speciﬁc guidance setting
forth the parameters under which these programs will qualify as charitable
organizations.
II. The Need for Postgraduate Training Programs
This Part brieﬂy sets forth the challenges facing legal education and the
diﬃculties that arise from the lack of aﬀordable legal services. These challenges
support the case we make in Part IV on why these programs are worthy of tax
exemption. Those already convinced that these problems are real may wish
to skip ahead to Part III, which addresses design considerations, or Part IV,
which focuses on the tax issues.
A. The Skills Gap
Legal education in America was originally provided through an apprentice
system, where would-be lawyers worked for established lawyers until they
gained suﬃcient knowledge and skills to be called to the bar.8 The ﬁrst law
schools appeared in the early 1800s9 and quickly displaced apprenticeship as
the primary path to becoming a lawyer.10 The modern law school curriculum
was developed in the 1890s, and it focused on legal theory, as opposed to
practice.11 Not surprisingly, newly minted lawyers coming from the law schools
lacked the experience and many of the practical skills typical of those who had
gone through years of apprenticeship. This change did not go unnoticed, and
from the very beginning, critics complained that law schools failed to produce
“practice-ready” lawyers.12 Initially, legal employers provided on-the-job
training, but as market conditions have changed, they have steadily reduced
the amount of training they provide, leaving a skills-training vacuum.13
8.

For a history of legal education in America, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the organization of the bar and how
lawyers were educated during diﬀerent periods).

9.

See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 5.

10.

Id. at 7.

11.

See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1949, 1973 (2012).

12.

See supra, sources cited in note 1. Of signiﬁcant recent note are the two American Bar
Association (ABA) studies on this issue, the so-called Cramton and MacCrate Reports, and
the more recent Carnegie Foundation Report. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC.
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979); AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—
AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2007).

13.

See Dilloﬀ supra note 2; see also, STATE BAR OF WIS., CHALLENGES TO THE PROFESSION COMM.,
THE CHALLENGES FACING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2011), http://www.reinhartlaw.com/

Postgraduate Legal Training: The Case for Tax-Exempt Programs

467

Over the past 30 years, law schools have increased their practical training
by setting up a wide range of legal clinics, creating professionally staﬀed
legal writing programs, expanding externship opportunities, and developing
professional skills and simulation courses in topics ranging from trial advocacy
to business planning. The number of client contact hours and amount of
experiential learning that graduates now have is staggering when compared
to just 20 years ago. Despite these advances, critics remain unsatisﬁed with
the amount of practical training law students receive and are pushing for even
greater skills training within law schools.14
Unfortunately, increasing skills training within the existing law school
curriculum would require either a signiﬁcant increase in tuition to pay for
such training15 or a radical reworking of the current system to focus on skills
training. Regardless of the merits of such suggestions, such a restructuring
seems unlikely in the short run.
services/buslaw/corpgovern/documents/art1111%20te.pdf; Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal
Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 598, 605-06 (2010).
14.

See, e.g., DEBORAH MARANVILLE ET AL., BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING LEGAL
EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD (2015); ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007). Both are projects of the Clinical Legal
Education Association.
Over the past few years, both the ABA and a number of state bar associations have moved
to increase skills requirements. The ABA has done so as part of its accreditation powers,
requiring students to take at least six hours of experiential learning. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 20152016 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, at 16 (Standard
303(a)(3)) (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_chapter_3.authcheckdam.pdf. The New York
and California bar associations are considering adopting practical skills requirements for
applicants to their respective bars. See, e.g., COMM. ON LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR,
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
E XECUTIVE C OMMITTEE (2014), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/D ownloadAsset.
aspx?id=46440 (discussing the need for greater skills training for new lawyers and
contemplating requiring bar applicants to have 12 hours of such training, whether through
clinics, externships or simulation courses, before being admitted to the bar); TASK FORCE ON
ADMISSION REGULATION REFORM, STATE BAR OF CAL., PHASE I FINAL REPORT (2013), http://
board.calbar.ca.gov/docs/agendaItem/Public/agendaitem1000010717.pdf (recommending
that applicants to the California State Bar be required to take 15 credit hours of experiential
learning while in law school).

15.

While one professor can easily teach 100 students in a core doctrinal course, clinical training
and writing classes require much smaller ratios. Robert Kuehn asserts that eighty-four
percent of all law schools already have the capacity to provide a clinical experience to every
student and that no diﬀerences in tuition exist between those schools that can provide such
experiences to all students and those that cannot. See Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal
Education, 92 DENV. L. REV. 1 (2014). However, the cost of additional resources necessary to
produce practice-ready lawyers would be prohibitive. One might think that schools could
use adjuncts for this purpose, because they both are less expensive than regular faculty and
have ongoing practice experience. However, these courses are often so labor intensive that
adjuncts may be unwilling to commit the time necessary. In addition, not every law school
is located near a large pool of adjuncts.
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Asking legal employers to train young lawyers also appears to be a nonstarter. Small ﬁrms often lack the capacity to train young lawyers, while
pressure to maintain the all-important proﬁts per partner number creates
strong incentives for larger ﬁrms to reduce or eliminate training.16 Clients are
increasingly unwilling to pay for associate training,17 leading large ﬁrms to hire
fewer ﬁrst year associates.18 High lawyer mobility also creates disincentives
for legal employers to train because such training will only beneﬁt future
employers. Nor does the future oﬀer much hope.19
16.

Indeed, there is signiﬁcant economic pressure not to hire recent graduates, with the common
wisdom being that law ﬁrms lose money on associates until their third year. See, e.g., Gregory
W. Bowman, Big Firm Economics 101: Why Are Associate Salaries So High?, LAW CAREER BLOG (Feb.
7, 2006), http://law-career.blogspot.com/2006/02/big-ﬁrm-economics-101-why-are.html
(suggesting that most ﬁrms don’t break even on associates until their third year of practice);
Debra L. Bruce, A Law Firm Associate’s Primer on Law Firm Economics, LAWYER COACH (June 10,
2013), http://www.lawyer-coach.com/index.php/2013/06/10/a-law-ﬁrm-associates-primeron-law-ﬁrm-economics/ (indicating that large ﬁrms she surveyed claimed that they needed
to collect $350,000 per associate to break even and associates were not proﬁtable for such
ﬁrms until around the fourth year); but see Ed Wessernan, Why Aren’t Associates More Proﬁtable?,
ED WESSERMAN (May 25, 2009), http://edwesemann.com/articles/proﬁtability/2009/05/25/
why-arent-associates-more-proﬁtable/ (arguing that the purported lack of proﬁtability may
derive from simplistic accounting practices that improperly assign overhead to associates).

17.

Ashby Jones & Joseph Palozzolo, What’s A First Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204774604576631360989675
324?mod=ITP_marketplace_0&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%
2Farticle%2FSB10001424052970204774604576631360989675324.html%3Fmod%3DITP_
marketplace_0 (noting that many general counsel are now unwilling to pay for ﬁrst-year
associate time).

18.

In 2008, nineteen percent of all attorneys found jobs at ﬁrms with over 251 lawyers. In
2011, that number dropped to 10.5 percent. Christopher J. Gearon, Reality Check for Law
Firm Associates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2012/11/01/reality-check-for-law-ﬁrm-associates.

19.

Technology and the ability to outsource legal work to other countries is likely to reduce
the number of associates needed. See, e.g., Michael G. Owen, Legal Outsourcing to India: The
Demise of New Lawyers and Junior Associates, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175
(2008). Moreover, ﬁrms may be shifting from the well-known pyramid structure to a new
“diamond” structure, in which ﬁrms are populated primarily by midlevel lawyers, with a
small group of equity owners and young associates on either side. See William Henderson
& Evan Parker, The Diamond Law Firm, A New Model or the Pyramid Unraveling?, LAWYER METRICS
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://lawyermetrics.com/2013/12/03/the-diamond-law-ﬁrm-a-new-model-orthe-pyramid-unraveling/. Worse yet, from a training perspective, is the predicted rise of
virtual ﬁrms, where individual lawyers with diﬀerent skills sets will come together to create
ad hoc ﬁrms for individual cases or transactions. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S
LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013). Such “ﬁrms” are anticipated to be
highly competitive and indeed may supplant traditional ﬁrms because they will likely have
low overhead and the ﬂexibility to add or cut members as needed. Because they will employ
only those essential to the case or transaction in question, the impetus to train young lawyers
will be greatly diminished.
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B. The Legal Services Gap
Law faculties are also well aware of the shortage of high-quality, aﬀordable
legal services. Legal fees have risen so high that a large number of Americans
simply can’t aﬀord to hire a lawyer. A recent survey by the National Law Journal
showed median ﬁrmwide billing rates of respondents for 2012 to be $425 per
hour. Even outside the major metropolitan areas, rates are quite high. A 2013
survey in Arizona revealed that the median hourly rate was $255 per hour, with
the average at $280.20 The rates vary by practice area, years of experience, ﬁrm
size, and location within the state, but rates at the 25th percentile rarely fall
below $200. This means that 20 hours of work typically costs around $5,000,
a signiﬁcant amount for someone who earns $50,000 per year.21
For the very poorest, free legal services are nominally available through
the Legal Services Corporation and the organizations they fund. However,
such organizations have restrictions on the types of cases they can take,22 and
the income levels at which people lose eligibility are so low that only a small
number qualify.23 Even with these limitations, the funding for these types of
services is nowhere near adequate to cover the needs of those who qualify.24
Indeed, government funding for legal services to the poor is constantly under
attack and unlikely to be increased in the near future.25
Many state bar organizations have implemented “modest means” programs,
where lawyers agree to represent customers up to two hundred ﬁfty percent of
20.

STATE BAR OF ARIZ., 2013 ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE IN ARIZONA (2013).

21.

The reasons for the market’s failure to produce lawyers willing and able to provide legal
services in the range between $100 and $200 per hour are puzzling. In a recent report,
the Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar Association of the Bar of
the City of New York suggested that rising student debt precludes lawyers from entering
public service or entering practices where they can charge aﬀordable rates but the lack of
reasonably priced legal services predates the recent rise in law school debt. COMM. ON LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., LAW SCHOOL DEBT AND THE PRACTICE
OF LAW, http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/lawSchoolDebt.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).

22.

See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., APPENDIX A: AUDIT GUIDE FOR
RECIPIENTS AND AUDITORS, http://www.oig.lsc.gov/aud/cs98/cs98r.pdf (last visited Nov.
22, 2015) (Compliance Supplement).

23.

The Federal Poverty Guidelines for 2015 set the poverty level for individuals at $11,770
and for a family of four at $24,250. 2015 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (2015), http://aspe.hhs.gov/2015-poverty-guidelines#threshholds. Legal services
organizations predominately provide free services to those who are at or lower than 125% of
the federal poverty level. See Who We Are, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/
who-we-are (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); Consumer’s Guide to Legal Help: Finding Free Help, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Feb. 5, 2015) , http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/ﬁndlegalhelp/faq_
freehelp.cfm.

24.

See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/
default/ﬁles/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pd.

25.

See, e.g., House Spending Bill Cuts LSC Budget By 20%, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (June 3, 2015), http://
www.lsc.gov/media-center/press-releases/2015/house-spending-bill-cuts-lsc-budget-20.
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the federal poverty level for $75 per hour.26 However, this barely puts a dent
into the demand. By some accounts, up to sixty percent of middle-class legal
needs go unmet.27 Self-help solutions exist, such as Legal Zoom28 and Nolo
Press,29 but such aids are no substitute for a trained attorney, especially when
matters stray beyond the routine.
The sad state of aﬀairs was perhaps best captured by the ABA in its 2013
draft report on potential changes to legal education:
[T]he services of these highly trained professionals may not be cost-eﬀective
for many actual or potential clients, and some communities and constituencies
lack realistic access to essential legal services . . . .
The current misdistribution of legal services and common lack of access
to legal advice of any kind requires innovative and aggressive remediation.30

The lack of legal representation not only harms those who cannot aﬀord
lawyers, but it also imposes signiﬁcant costs on society, writ large. For
instance, pro se litigants impose signiﬁcant costs on the legal system. As Chief
Justice Chase Rogers of the Connecticut Supreme Court has noted, pro se
litigants “clog up the court system. Cases are delayed and lengthened, creating
frustration for everybody.”31 This problem is especially acute in family law
courts,32 though it is experienced elsewhere. Pro se litigants need assistance in
26.

See, e.g., MODEST MEANS PROJECT, http://www.azﬂse.org/modestmeans/ (last visited Nov.
22, 2015).

27.

See Spieler, supra note 4.

28.

Welcome to Legal Zoom, LEGAL ZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/index-new-c.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2015).

29.

NOLO, http://www.nolo.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).

30.

See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., DRAFT REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/task_force_on_legaleducation_draft_
report_september2013.authcheckdam.pdf (hereinafter ABA DRAFT REPORT).

31.

Editorial, Coping with Pro Se Litigants, CONN. L. TRIB., JUNE 17, 2013, at 29.

32.

A 1990 survey found that in ﬁfty-two percent of Arizona divorces, neither party was
represented, while in approximately eight-eight percent one party was not represented.
BRUCE D. SALES ET AL., SELF-REPRESENTATION IN DIVORCE CASES (1993). Other states reported
similar statistics. See Berenson, supra note 5, at 109.
One solution to this problem could be to allow paralegals or others with limited training
to handle these types of disputes. Washington State has recently issuing limited licenses to
legal technicians in this area. See Limited License Legal Technician Board, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/LimitedLicense-Legal-Technician-Board (last visited Nov. 19, 2015). While this approach may help
some clients, it is also fraught because client needs may go beyond the scope of permissible
practice, and those with limited training may miss important legal issues. Moreover, it does
not address the lawyer training issues focused on here.
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ﬁlling out forms and help from judges during hearings and trials.33 Cases that
should settle go to trial; trials can take a lot longer than necessary.
Equally troubling is the fact that justice may not be served. Pro se litigants
with good cases may lose because they do not understand the rules of evidence
or fail to introduce necessary evidence because they do not understand the
legal standard.34 In addition, judges may be inclined to help those without
lawyers, thus abandoning their neutral position; or they may sit back and
watch pro se litigants with winning cases lose.35 Neither outcome is good.
Pro se representation can also lead to the law developing in unfortunate
ways. In our adversarial system, we rely on the parties to brief the issues so that
the judges can make good decisions on both the facts (in bench trials) and the
law. Pro se litigants do not always make the best arguments, depriving judges
of the opportunity to see all sides of a legal issue, which can lead to bad law.36
III. Postgraduate Training Design Considerations
So, how might we tackle these twin problems? Postgraduate legal training
programs can help new lawyers gain the skills and experience they need to be
successful lawyers, while addressing the legal services gap. Given the scope
of the problems, such programs are unlikely to solve them fully, but they are
certainly a step in the right direction.
Once one accepts that postgraduate legal training programs are desirable,
questions arise as to how best to structure them. The ﬁrst question is whether
law schools should take the lead in establishing and operating such programs.
The next question focuses on whether programs should operate as incubators,
with recent graduates operating their own law practices, or more like medical
residency programs, where attorneys work for the program, which is responsible
for generating work. The ﬁnal question is whether the program should operate
as part of the law school or as a stand-alone entity. In this Part, we focus on
these design decisions.
33.

SALES, ET AL., supra note 32, at 112–17.

34.

Studies have shown that, in the low-income context, represented parties in the U.S. Tax
Court do roughly twice as well as those who litigate pro se. See OFFICE OF THE TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS PROGRAM REPORT 9 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p5066.pdf. While some of the diﬀerence may stem from the fact that represented
parties may settle more losing cases, it likely does not account for the entire diﬀerence.

35.

Id.

36.

For instance, in In re the Shaheen Trust, 341 P.3d 1169 (2015), pro se beneﬁciaries alleged that
a trustee had breached its trust. The trustee counterclaimed, arguing that the beneﬁciaries
should forfeit their interests under a no-contest clause. Id. at 1170. The trial court and court of
appeals both held that alleging a breach of trust was tantamount to challenging the validity
of a disposition, triggering a forfeiture of their interests. Id. at 1170-71. Had the beneﬁciaries
hired lawyers, this issue likely would have been decided diﬀerently. At the very least, it
would have been squarely presented.
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A. Why Should Law Schools Create and Operate Postgraduate Training Programs?
Acknowledging that there is a gap between legal training and the skills law
graduates need for practice and that there are unmet needs for legal services is
not the same as concluding that law schools should take the lead in addressing
either problem. As noted above, neither law schools nor legal employers seem
poised to act, leaving law schools and other nonproﬁts. Traditional legal
nonproﬁts, such as state bar associations and the ABA, provide some training
to their members and facilitate their members providing pro bono and lowbono work, but it seems highly unlikely that they would create programs of
the scope or size we are discussing. The same goes for governmental agencies.
This leaves law schools, which are dedicated to teaching and to the success
of their graduates and have an abiding interest in the legal system, writ large,
including access to legal services. Moreover, they have experience with legal
clinics that they can draw on in designing and running postgraduate programs.
This is not to suggest that only law schools should create such programs.
Indeed, many lawyers would likely relish the opportunity to train young
lawyers while helping people who cannot otherwise aﬀord legal representation.
Rather, in the current environment, law schools may be in the best position to
create such programs, in part because their students are directly aﬀected by the
skills gap, and it could be easier for law school-aﬃliated programs to obtain
tax exemption. Once the models in their various forms have been established
and put through their paces, it would make sense to encourage others to step
in and create their own postgraduate training programs.
B. Incubator v. Residency
Postgraduate training programs come in many forms, and law schools must
decide whether the programs should operate as incubaotrs or residencies.
Incubators are typically aimed at those interested in establishing their own
law practices.37 Law schools provide space, some infrastructure, and a mentor
to help participants. Most incubators rely on the participants to generate their
own work, obtain their own malpractice insurance, and establish their own
IOLTA accounts,38 among other tasks. In contrast, residency programs operate
more like traditional ﬁrms in that they have practice areas run by seasoned
attorneys. The resident attorneys work for the program, which is responsible
for setting up the infrastructure and generating the work.

37.

See, for example, the incubator programs operating at the California Western School of
Law and the Thomas Jeﬀerson School of Law. See Incubator/Residency Program Proﬁles, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/initiatives_awards/
program_main/program_proﬁles.html?cq_ck=1425594085817 (last visited Nov. 22, 2015)
(hereinafter ABA Program Proﬁles).

38.

Most lawyers must establish trust accounts, referred to as IOLTA accounts, to hold client
money. For a discussion of such accounts in Arizona, see Trust Account, ARIZ. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.azbar.org/media/50359/trustaccount.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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Incubators generally require far less in the way of planning, infrastructure,
or institutional commitment than do residency programs. They also pose
far less risk.39 Participants bear much of the economic risk if they cannot
generate business, and the law schools are generally not seen to be engaged
in the practice of law, with all the risk that entails. This perhaps explains why
incubators are the most popular form of postgraduate training programs to
date.40
However, incubators may not meet the needs or goals of every kind of law
graduate. Not every graduate wants to establish a solo practice, especially
right out of law school, or has the capacity to generate suﬃcient business oﬀ of
which to live. Residency programs can provide ﬁnancial security by paying the
new lawyers and assuming the responsibility of generating the work. They may
also allow for a more controlled experience, one where trained lawyers educate
and mentor new lawyers in a way that incubators cannot typically accomplish.
However, residency programs are far more expensive and complicated than
simple incubators and may encounter greater resistance from the practicing
bar because of concerns over competition. Nonetheless, on balance, we believe
that residency-like programs can provide a better training environment, have
the potential to train a signiﬁcantly larger number of lawyers, and can provide
more legal services to those who currently go without. Accordingly, these
programs deserve serious consideration.
C. Should Programs Be Established Within or Outside of Law Schools?
Another important decision is whether programs should be housed within
law schools or created as stand-alone entities. Internal programs could be
operated as a law school activity, like moot court, or through a separate legal
entity, such as a single-member LLC or a nonproﬁt corporation.41 Stand-alone
programs would be established as a new legal entity. This decision involves a
number of diﬀerent considerations, many of which push in diﬀerent directions.
Locating the program within a law school or as part of the broader university
oﬀers a number of beneﬁts. First and foremost, schools can maintain control
over personnel, direction, selection of participants, etc. Moreover, law school
programs may have access to university resources, including facilities, human
resources, and personnel, including the general counsel’s oﬃce. They may also
be able to oﬀer university beneﬁts to employees. Locating programs within
law schools may also make it easier to get faculty involved and to ensure that
39.

Obviously, the law school could be subjected to vicarious liability for its connection to the
incubator, but it is unlikely that incubators present the same type of malpractice problems
as does a residency-style postgraduate legal training program.

40.

See ABA Program Proﬁles, supra note 37, for a description of law school-aﬃliated postgraduate
training programs.

41.

In some cases, this approach may not be possible because of state law. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST.,
ART IX, § 7 (precluding state agencies from owning other organizations). Other issues
with corporate documents or state charters may arise, but they are beyond the scope of this
article.
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any knowledge the program generates is passed along to those responsible
for designing and implementing the law school curriculum. Finally, locating
programs within law schools may also help brand the program and promote
the school. In particular, it may highlight the ways in which the school is
embedded in the local community and engaged in addressing community
concerns, needs, and issues.42 It may also help attract clients who might
otherwise distrust lawyers.
However, locating a postgraduate program within a law school or university
also entails a number of risks. For instance, it may subject the university to
legal liability should there be malpractice.43 While these risks already exist
with clinics and can be oﬀset with insurance, postgraduate programs may
increase the risk. Even absent malpractice, the practice of law can be quite
contentious, and both the client and lawyer on the other side may harbor ill
will toward the institution. Clients also may develop unrealistic expectations
and blame their lawyers if things go wrong. Disgruntled individuals could
engage in a wide range of activities, including suing the university, posting
derogatory comments online, or even complaining to local politicians. Such
complaints could create problems, especially for state universities.
Postgraduate training programs also run the risk of alienating law school
alumni, who might perceive them as competition. Unlike clinics, which
represent pro bono clients, most postgraduate programs, or the lawyers
participating in them, will represent at least some paying clients. Schools need
to be wary of competing against their own graduates or otherwise antagonizing
them.44
To the extent that incubator programs simply provide infrastructure and
some mentoring to new lawyers who are setting up their own practices, the
risks seem fairly low, and housing such programs within a law school makes
sense. In contrast, residency programs likely are best created as stand-alone
entities. While the law school might be seen as the creative force behind such
programs, the diminished control and management shield schools from at
least some of the ﬁnancial and political fallout, if any.
VI. Tax Exemption and the Postgraduate Legal Training Program
Any postgraduate legal training program will likely want to take advantage
of the beneﬁts of operating as a tax-exempt charitable organization. As
42.

For an example of this approach, see Arizona State University, whose design aspirations
include social embeddedness and transforming society. See A NEW AMERICAN UNIVERSITY,
http://newamericanuniversity.asu.edu/#1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).

43.

The university could create the program as a separate legal entity within the university’s
corporate family, but there is always the concern that the corporate or LLC veil could be
pierced or some agency relationship be found.

44.

In some cases, state law prohibits state actors from competing in areas where the private
market functions. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-2753.
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described below, postgraduate legal training programs located within law
schools will generally not need to seek tax-exempt status. Most ABA-accredited
law schools are either tax-exempt organizations under Internal Revenue
Code (“Code”) Section 501(c)(3) or operated by a state,45 and under most
circumstances programs located within such schools will be automatically be
considered tax-exempt. The question in this situation is whether a program’s
activity could jeopardize the law school’s tax-exempt status or subject the
school to the unrelated business income tax (UBIT). In contrast, stand-alone
programs must consider whether to seek tax-exempt status and, if so, whether
they would qualify for such status under current law and IRS guidance. This
Part explores these important questions.
Professor Colombo has written a thoughtful article on this topic, focusing
primarily on programs operated within law schools.46 We generally agree with
his assessment that such programs should not create any tax problems for law
schools that establish them. Colombo’s brief discussion of stand-alone ﬁrms
focuses on “commerciality” and the cases that involve charitable organizations
operating for-proﬁt businesses. He concludes that it is unclear whether they
could obtain tax exemption. We argue that a properly designed postgraduate
training program should qualify for exempt status under a diﬀerent line of
authority that addresses charitable organizations that provide on-the-job
training. Moreover, its income, if any, should not be subject to UBIT.
A. Why Tax Exemption?
Before turning to the existing law and guidance, we discuss the beneﬁts of
tax exemption as well as the normative question of whether such programs
should qualify for tax exemption. As discussed below, especially in the context
of stand-alone programs, the authorities are not directly on point, and tax
authorities will have some discretion on how to apply them. Considering the
question from a theoretical perspective ﬁrst provides guidance as to how they
should exercise it.
1. The Benefits of Tax-Exempt Status
Most programs will not generate signiﬁcant income, raising the question
of why tax exemption matters. Charitable status under Code Section
501(c)(3) would provide postgraduate training programs a number of beneﬁts,
the most important of which might be the ability to raise money from donors.
Creating and maintaining a postgraduate legal training program could be
quite expensive. While most programs will likely charge fees, the fees may
not be suﬃcient to cover all costs. Even if a program can break even, it seems
45.

For a list of ABA-accredited law schools, see ABA Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/
in_alphabetical_order.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).

46.

John D. Colombo, The Federal Tax Exemption Aspects of Law Schools Running Their Own Law Firms, 72
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 153 (2013) [hereinafter Colombo, Tax Exemption Aspects].
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highly unlikely that any program would be self-sustaining for the ﬁrst several
years. Fundraising may be critical to getting stand-alone programs up and
running and could permit them to oﬀer additional pro bono and low-bono
services, thus increasing the demand for services and the opportunities for
participating attorneys to receive training.
While programs could certainly solicit tax-free gifts,47 charitable status
under Code Section 501(c)(3) would permit donors to deduct such gifts
as charitable contributions under Code Section 170.48 Moreover, it would
signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood that private foundations and governments
would be willing to make grants. Private foundation rules require foundations
to make signiﬁcant grants each year49 to accomplish charitable purposes.50
While foundations can give to taxable entities, they risk a signiﬁcant penalty
and potentially their tax-exempt status if (1) they do not annually pay enough
out to support charitable activity51 or (2) they do not closely scrutinize the
use of money provided to non-charitable organizations to ensure it is used
for charitable purposes.52 As a result, foundations rarely make grants to
organizations that are not public charities.53 Additionally, government grants
are often dependent upon the organization being a nonproﬁt organization.54
47.

I.R.C. § 102 (2012).

48.

Charitable contributions to government entities, their political subdivisions, and some
organizations whose income is exempt from tax under Code Section 115 are also deductible.
I.R.C. § 115 (2012). For a brief discussion of the section 115 issue and deductibility, see
Governmental Information Letter, I.R.S. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/
Federal,-State-&-Local-Governments/Governmental-Information-Letter.

49.

I.R.C. § 4942(a), (d)–(e) (2012).

50.

The expenditures must be used to support the charitable purposes listed in Code Section
170(c)(2), which include educational purposes. I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2012).

51.

I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2012). Private foundations typically accomplish this by transferring funds
directly to charitable organizations that qualify as public charities under section 509(a).

52.

I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2012). This is typically referred to as expenditure responsibility.
Failure to monitor expenditures can result in an excise tax starting at twenty percent
of the expenditure. See Grants by Private Foundations: Expenditure Responsibility, I.R.S.
(July 7, 2015) http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Private-Foundations/
Grants-by-Private-Foundations:-Expenditure-Responsibility.

53.

A public charity is an organization that qualiﬁes as tax-exempt under Code Section 501(c)
(3) and either operates a favored type of public institution such as a church or a hospital,
or receives a substantial amount of support from the public or the government. I.R.C. §
509(a)(1) & (2) (2012). While it might be possible to use a university’s foundation (which
in most cases actually qualiﬁes as a public charity) as a conduit for donations and grants,
the university foundation is also likely unwilling to make grants to a for-proﬁt entity. While
expenditure responsibility does not apply to a public charity, it needs to keep good records,
just like a private foundation, to ensure that money sent to a for-proﬁt entity uses the grant
for a charitable purpose. See, e.g., Compliance Guide for § 501(c)(3) Public Charities, 16, I.R.S.
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf. Thus, public charities are often hesitant to
make grants to for proﬁt entities as well.

54.

See, e.g., Basic Field Grant, LEG. SVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-resources/our-
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Postgraduate legal training programs that want to seek grants from private
foundations and the government are well-advised to form a charitable
organization and qualify for public charity status.
In addition, many states and local governments oﬀer beneﬁts to
organizations exempt from tax under Section 501(c)(3), such as exemptions
from property and sales taxes.55 Status as a charity may also permit resident
attorneys to participate in loan-forgiveness programs, which could act as a salary
supplement.56 Under certain narrow circumstances, tax-exempt organizations
may be able to also take advantage of private activity tax-exempt bonds,57
which could provide a program a cheaper way to raise funds for its facilities.
Finally, tax-exempt status may send a signal to both clients and the local bar.
Many potential clients distrust lawyers and assume that they are only out to line
their own pockets. Tax-exempt status would make clear that a postgraduate
legal training program is not driven by a proﬁt motive. The local bar may
also feel less threatened if a program is tax-exempt.58 Admittedly, establishing
the program as a nonproﬁt corporation provides many of these same beneﬁts.
However, because most people expect nonproﬁts to be qualiﬁed as charitable
organizations by the IRS, some may be confused if the program does not
obtain tax-exempt status.
Before turning to consider whether postgraduate legal training programs
should be considered charitable organizations, it is worthwhile to consider
whether one of the new hybrid entities, such as low-proﬁt limited liability
companies, beneﬁt corporations, and ﬂexible purpose corporations, might
be appropriate.59 After all, these programs operate like normal businesses
grant-programs/basic-ﬁeld-grant (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (requiring its grant recipients to
be nonproﬁt organizations with legal aid services as a charitable purpose).
55.

For some beneﬁts provided by states, see Bazil Facchina, Evan Showell, & Jan E. Stone,
Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonproﬁt Organizations: A Catalog and Some Thoughts on Nonproﬁt
Policymaking, 28 U. S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993-1994).

56.

See, e.g., Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUD. AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.
ed.gov/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/charts/public-service (last visited Nov. 19, 2015)
(describing federal loan-forgiveness programs for those engaged in public service). These
programs often have a length-of-service requirement. Given that the typical postgraduate
law ﬁrm would only allow a student to stay two to three years, the postgraduate law ﬁrm is
likely only a partial answer to this loan-forgiveness question.

57.

I.R.C. § 145 (2012). Admittedly, obtaining a bond for these organizations would present
some substantial challenges.

58.

Establishing the program as a tax-exempt entity could arguably give such programs an
advantage vis-à-vis for-proﬁt ﬁrms, so care must be taken to ensure that the programs focus
on their educational mission and on those who are currently locked out of the market.

59.

See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV. 387
(2014). The statutes authorizing such entities appear aimed at the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, which constrains managers’ ability to consider beneﬁts to other
constituents in their decision-making. Presumably, though, an L3C that adopted the twelve
requirements needed for an LLC to seek exemption described, infra, note 97, could qualify
under those circumstances.
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in that they charge clients, but they are tempered by strong social policy
objectives of training new lawyers and creating greater access to legal services.
Unfortunately, hybrid entities will not provide the beneﬁts of tax exemption.
First, these organizations cannot generally qualify as tax-exempt charitable
organizations.60 Nor will investments in such organizations by foundations
automatically qualify as program-related investments that count toward their
qualiﬁed distribution requirement.61 Thus, hybrid entities would have no
better chance of receiving grants from a private foundation than a for-proﬁt
business. They also might not be able to access governmental grants. Second,
even if the tax issues were resolved favorably, it is not clear that clients or the
local bar would accept hybrid entities to the same degree they would accept
a charitable tax-exempt organization. Proﬁts from hybrids can be distributed,
undercutting much of the messaging and assurances that nonproﬁt and taxexempt status provides.
2. Postgraduate Legal Training Programs Should Qualify for Tax
Exemption as a Theoretical Matter
Before delving into the current guidance, it helps to consider more
generally whether postgraduate programs are the type of activity for which
tax exemption should be allowed. Answering that question may aﬀect how
strictly or narrowly authorities should read existing authority, none of which is
directly on point. The scholarly debate over why the government should aﬀord
some organizations tax-exempt status began in earnest with an article by Boris
Bittker and George Rahdert, in which the authors argued that an exemption
from income tax for donation-receiving organizations was warranted on the
grounds that charitable organizations do not have income in the same sense
as for-proﬁt ﬁrms.62 Funds must be used for charitable purposes and, if such
expenditures are considered deductible, by deﬁnition expenses will equal
income, leading to no net income for tax purposes.63
60.

While some have pushed to extend tax-exempt status to hybrids, they lack many of the
characteristics, such as the non-distribution constraint, that traditional tax-exempt entities
possess, making it diﬃcult to determine whether and to what extent they serve the public
good. For a discussion of the reasons that such organizations should not receive tax-exempt
status, see Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 59, at 421-41.

61.

Id. at 396.

62.

Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonproﬁt Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).

63.

For more recent analyses of whether income taxation of nonproﬁt organizations is appropriate
on income measurement grounds, see Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a
Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 283 (2011). See also Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk
About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013) (providing a related justiﬁcation, namely that
under the shareholder theory of corporate law we have no justiﬁcation for taxing charitable
organizations because they have no shareholders).
William D. Andrews oﬀered a related justiﬁcation for the charitable contribution
deduction, arguing that the individuals who contribute income to public beneﬁt
organizations should get a deduction because they dedicated their funds to public rather
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In response, Henry B. Hansmann argued that tax exemption should be
viewed as a subsidy to organizations that produce public or quasi-public
goods.64 Under this theory, producers of such goods will fail to produce
at optimal levels because they are unable to capture all the beneﬁts their
activities produce.65 The government can overcome the free-rider problem
and consequent market failure by using its taxing power to force everyone
to contribute to the production of such goods. Alternatively, the government
can subsidize public good production by aﬀording tax exemption to private
organizations and creating tax incentives for others to provide the necessary
funds.66 Although Hansmann’s argument was not focused on the charitable
contribution deduction, the deduction can be seen as a device to direct
additional funds to organizations producing public goods, either by lowering
the cost of private giving or allowing taxpayers to designate where their tax
dollars should go.67
Although others have advanced other theories,68 we believe that Hansmann
oﬀers the best justiﬁcation for tax exemption. Thus, we examine postgraduate
legal training programs under his market failure theory. The IRS itself has
adopted a market failure justiﬁcation in its guidance regarding public
than private consumption. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309, 360 (1972).
64.

See Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonproﬁt Organizations from Corporate Income
Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58 (1981); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonproﬁt Enterprise, 89
YALE L.J. 835 (1980). In addition to pointing out the free-rider problems associated with
public good production, Hansmann also noted that nonproﬁt status, and in particular the
non-distribution constraint, served an important signal in cases where the market cannot
adequately monitor behavior.

65.

A true public good is nonrival and non-excludable, meaning that the consumption by
one person does not diminish the ability of others to consume, and the producer cannot
exclude people from consuming it. True public goods are quite rare, but similar market
failure problems arise with private goods that have positive externalities, often referred to as
quasi-public goods. For ease of reference, we will use the term public goods to describe both
public and quasi-public goods.

66.

The latter option is especially appealing if one believes that the government is likely to
fail to set public good production at the appropriate level. For a discussion of why the
government might fail to set the right mix or level, see Adam Chodorow, Charity with Chinese
Characteristics, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2012).

67.

These alternative visions of the charitable deduction can be seen in Paul R. McDaniel,
Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L.
REV. 377 (1972).

68.

See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonproﬁt Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990); Evelyn
Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585
(1998); Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations:
A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998); Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Tax
Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997); Mark A.
Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonproﬁt Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of
Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991) For a discussion of those theories, see Chodorow,
supra note 66.
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interest law ﬁrms, leading us to believe that such a theoretical basis should be
persuasive to the IRS.69
We note that not every market failure deserves to be corrected through a
public subsidy. For instance, there is likely a market failure associated with
car repair. Car owners do not trust car mechanics because of an information
asymmetry problem. However, we do not argue that the IRS should allow
car mechanics to operate as tax-exempt charitable organizations. Rather, the
extent to which the public, writ large, is aﬀected by the failure must be taken
into account. We are not able to identify the exact point at which public harm
or public good rises to the level where subsidy is justiﬁed, but we believe onthe-job training and the provision of legal services to those who cannot aﬀord
them fall well within the traditional ambit of public beneﬁt to qualify.
We contend that two diﬀerent market failures warrant government subsidy
for postgraduate legal training programs. The ﬁrst is the failure of law schools
and legal employers to provide meaningful educational training opportunities
to new lawyers. The second is the lack of aﬀordable legal services for the
vast majority of Americans, which causes a signiﬁcant number of people to
forgo lawyers. Either alone warrants tax exemption and the subsidy it entails.
Together, they make an even stronger case.
Education has traditionally been seen as a quasi-public good, beneﬁting
not only those who acquire it, but also society generally. Recognition of
education’s status as a quasi-public good can be seen in the long history of
public education in the United States,70 as well as in its prominent role in
the creation of the charitable deduction nearly 100 years ago.71 Economic
theory suggests that people will underinvest in education from a societal
perspective because they will not be compensated for the value it provides to
the community at large. This is precisely what we have seen.
Given the beneﬁts that ﬂow to lawyers, some may question whether legal
education—as opposed to secondary or college education—is a public or
private good. As a recent ABA report of the future of legal education noted, it
has characteristics of both:
69.

Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (reasoning that public interest
law ﬁrms can be exempt where the market would not otherwise provide a particular service).

70.

See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 120 YEARS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL
PORTRAIT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (Thomas D. Snyder ed. 1993),
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf. Indeed, Thomas Jeﬀerson repeatedly argued that an
educated populace was central to the country’s success. See, e.g., A Bill for the More General
Diﬀusion of Knowledge, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS: PUBLIC PAPERS 365 (Library of America
1984) (“The most eﬀectual means of preventing [the perversion of power into tyranny are]
to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large, and more especially to
give them knowledge of those facts which history exhibits, that possessed thereby of the
experience of other ages and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its
shapes, and prompt to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes.”).

71.

See 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Henry French Hollis) (indicating that a key
reason for enacting the charitable deduction was a fear that wealthy individuals would not
otherwise donate to institutions of higher education).
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On the one hand, the training of lawyers is a public good. Society has a deep
interest in the competence of lawyers, in their availability to serve society and
clients, and in their values. This concern reﬂects the centrality of lawyers in
the eﬀective functioning of ordered society. Society also has a deep interest in
the system that trains lawyers. This is because the system directly aﬀects the
competence, availability, and values of lawyers … . The fact that the training
of lawyers is a public good is a reason there is much more concern today with
problems in law schools and legal education than with problems in education
in other disciplines, like business schools and business education.
But the training of lawyers is not only a public good. The training of
lawyers is also a private good. Legal education provides those who pursue
it with skills, knowledge, and credentials that will enable them to earn a
livelihood. . . .72

The question isn’t whether lawyers beneﬁt from their training, but rather
whether the market fails to produce the optimal level of training. That point
seems unassailable, at least if one asks legal employers. Finally, we note that
this objection is not unique to training lawyers; all education includes a
component of private beneﬁt, and we support it regardless of whether the
learner is young or old, rich or poor, engaged in highly practical or deeply
theoretical work.
The second market failure is the lack of aﬀordable, high-quality legal services
for large numbers of Americans. As described above in Part II.B, up to sixty
percent of legal needs for the middle class are going unmet.73 This aﬀects not
only those who cannot aﬀord lawyers, but also society at large. Pro se litigants
slow down the operation of the courts, people’s rights go unprotected, and
parties enter into suboptimal deals. In a society like ours, where virtually every
activity is touched by the law, the lack of legal resources can undermine the
rule of law itself.74
Finally from a practical standpoint, we believe society has already
made a favorable judgment regarding subsidizing a highly similar training
arrangement. Postgraduate legal training looks a lot like postgraduate medical
training, which we willingly subsidize. Despite two years of clinical training in
medical school, newly graduated doctors must undertake a one-year internship
and then a residency under the close supervision of experienced physicians
with a mandate to train new doctors. Only after they have completed such
programs are new doctors viewed as fully qualiﬁed to practice on their own.
In all, this postgraduate training typically takes three to ﬁve years. As with the
postgraduate legal training program described here, the new doctors are paid
for their services, though below market rates, and hospitals charge clients for
the services rendered.
72.

ABA DRAFT REPORT, supra note 30, at 6.

73.

Spieler, supra note 4, at 369-76.

74.

Berenson, supra note 5.
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According to a recent report, the government contributes approximately
$15 billion to subsidize postgraduate medical training through Medicare
and Medicaid,75 in addition to funding other agencies, such as the National
Institutes of Health and the Department of Veterans Aﬀairs and the states.
This funding supports approximately 115,000 residents each year at a cost
of about $100,000 per resident per year, or about $500,000 per each new
physician. Millions of Americans otherwise unable to aﬀord medical services
beneﬁt from these subsidies, which can be justiﬁed based on the positive
externalities associated with a healthy populace.76
Medicine and law clearly diﬀer, and one could argue that the failure to train
doctors adequately within the medical school setting is greater than the failure
to train lawyers, because the consequences of a market failure in medicine are
more signiﬁcant than in law. After all, a shortage of trained doctors could lead
to loss of life, while the lack of trained lawyers typically has only monetary
consequences. However, not all medical issues are life-threatening, and bad
lawyering could lead to loss of liberty and even life in the criminal context.
Lawyers help establish and protect individual rights, act as transaction cost
engineers,77 and aid with the smooth functioning of the legal system. While
private parties capture many of these beneﬁts, society as a whole beneﬁts when
people are well-represented.
Moreover, the proposal regarding postgraduate legal education does not
require direct investment. Nor is it likely to involve anywhere near the amount
of government subsidy as is seen in medicine. Given the anticipated lack of
proﬁts at postgraduate legal training programs, the subsidy will likely be
limited to the taxes that would have been paid on amounts donated to such
organizations.
Given the positive externalities associated with legal education and the
negative externalities that arise when people are not well-represented, we
believe postgraduate legal training programs are worthy of a subsidy in the
form of tax exemption and the ability to receive tax-deductible donations.
B. Postgraduate Legal Training Programs Within the University Setting
A program operating within the university setting would either operate as
an activity of the law school or as a separate legal entity owned by the law
school or university, such as a single-member Limited Liability Company
(LLC) or a controlled nonproﬁt corporation. How such programs are treated
75.

Catherine Dower, Graduate Medical Education, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF, Aug. 16, 2012, at 1, http://
healthaﬀairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_73.pdf.

76.

Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1389
(2015).

77.

See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for
Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
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and the impact on the sponsoring law school depends on whether the law
school is public or private and how the program is organized.
1. Public Law Schools
State entities, including universities, generally do not need to qualify for
tax exemption under section 501(c)(3).78 Instead, they are exempt from federal
income tax because of sovereign immunity or because the Code does not
identify government entities as taxpayers.79 If a postgraduate training program
were operated without separate legal form, it would be considered an activity
of the law school and would partake of the law school’s tax exemption and
factor into decisions about whether exemption was appropriate in the ﬁrst
place.
If the program is organized as a separate legal entity,80 perhaps to protect
the school against liability, the path to exemption depends on the type of
entity formed. One option would be to organize the program as a singlemember LLC, with the law school acting as the sole member. Single-member
LLCs are generally ignored for tax purposes,81 and any activity carried out
by such a program would simply be considered the activity of the school and
automatically exempt, though potentially subject to UBIT.82
Alternatively, the law school could create a controlled nonproﬁt corporation.
Such entities might be granted tax-exempt status under a number of diﬀerent
theories. First, the corporation could apply for 501(c)(3) status, discussed
below in Part IV.C. Second, it could be considered exempt as an “integral
part” of the law school or university. The IRS treats an organization as an
integral part of a state or political subdivision when the state or political
subdivision controls the organization’s operation without an independent
78.

See Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local Governments: The Need for Congressional Action,
26 GA. L. REV. 421 (1992) (hereinafter Aprill, Excluding Income).

79.

See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 14,407 (Jan. 28, 1935). See Rev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 28; Rev.
Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29. See also Ellen P. Aprill, The Integral, the Essential, and the Instrumental:
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Governmental Aﬃliates, 23 J. CORP. L. 803 (1998) (hereinafter Aprill,
Tax Treatment of Governmental Aﬃliates). Most state schools are probably not considered the state
or a political subdivision thereof because schools do not exercise one of the three sovereign
powers of a state: (1) power to tax, (2) power of eminent domain, or (3) the police power. See
Estate of Shamberg v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 131, (1944), aﬀ’d, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 792 (1945). Instead, they are probably considered an integral part of the state.

80.

In some cases, this may not be possible. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST., art. IX, § 7 (banning state
entities from owning stock in or otherwise owning companies).

81.

Organizations typically treat single-member LLCs as partnerships for tax purposes. In such
cases, LLCs are ignored for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended 2014).
However, members may elect to treat LLCs as corporations for tax purposes. In such cases,
activities at the LLC would no longer be considered activities of the law school.

82.

Contributions to LLCs wholly owned by a section 501(c)(3) parent are deductible as
charitable contributions if the contributions meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 170. See I.R.S.
Notice 2011-52, I.R.B. 2011-30 (June 25, 2011).
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organizational structure,83 though in some cases such structures are permitted.84
Unfortunately, as Professor Aprill has noted,85 the IRS has been inconsistent
in how it applies these rulings, and any school taking this path would probably
need to seek a private letter ruling. While we believe that tax-exempt status
should be allowed for the policy reasons noted above, it is not clear how the
IRS would actually rule.
Third, a public school could attempt to ﬁt the program within Code Section
115.86 Section 115 does not technically exempt the entity from taxation; instead,
it excuses from tax any income derived from the exercise of an “essential
governmental function” that accrues to a state or political subdivision.87
Integral part and Code Section 115 are similar, but important diﬀerences exist.
In particular, Code Section 115 requires less day-to-day control. The IRS tends
to be quite lenient in construing both the “essential governmental function”
and “accruing” elements,88 while courts have taken a more stringent view,
leaving legal advice on the matter somewhat challenging. The primary reasons
for seeking exclusion under either the integral part doctrine or Code Section
115 over Code Section 501(c)(3) would be to eliminate the Form 990 ﬁling
requirement and escape general supervision by the IRS under provisions such
as Code Section 4958 (excess beneﬁt transactions).
From a tax perspective, it would be much easier for a school to run the
program as an activity or through an LLC. The other approaches make sense
only if non-tax considerations precluded doing so. Regardless of the legal
theory for exemption or how the program is organized, the primary tax-related
83.

See Rev. Rul. 60-384, 1960-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18. See also Aprill, Tax Treatment
of Governmental Aﬃliates, supra note 79, at 810.

84.

Aprill, Tax Treatment of Governmental Aﬃliates, supra note 79, at 810, citing to I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 97-33-003 (May 9, 1997); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-06-006 (Nov. 8, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-27-016 (Apr. 5, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-22-019 (Feb. 28, 1996). The IRS has
suggested that, where the state is “substantially involved” in an organization’s activities, it can
be considered an integral part. Joseph O’Malley, Elizabeth Mayer, & Marvin Friedlander,
State Institutions—Instrumentalities, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 1996,
at 5, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicf96.pdf. The following factors are important
in determining involvement: (1) creation of the organization by executive order of the
governor of a state, (2) creation of the organization by executive order of the governor of a
state as an oﬃcial state agency, (3) a state or a state agency having the power to appoint and
remove the organization’s board, (4) a state or a state agency having the power to abolish
the organization, (5) a state or a state agency monitoring the organization’s activities, and
(6) the organization using government employees to conduct its activities. Id.

85.

See Aprill, Tax Treatment of Governmental Aﬃliates, supra note 79.

86.

Rev. Rul. 60-384, 1960-2 C.B. 172.

87.

I.R.C. § 115 (2012). Under this provision, the program would be able to receive taxdeductible donations and grant funding from private foundations, just like organizations
granted tax-exempt status under Code Section 501(c)(3).

88.

See Aprill, Excluding Income, supra note 78.
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danger for a public law school is whether any income the program generates
would be subject to UBIT, which is discussed below in Part IV.C.4.89
2. Private Law Schools
Unlike public law schools, private law schools typically obtain taxexempt status by qualifying as charitable organizations under Code Section
501(c)(3). To qualify under that section, entities must be organized and
operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes. Education is one of
the approved exempt purposes.90 Having a substantial non-exempt purpose is
fatal to an organization’s application or continuing exempt status, even if an
organization has several exempt purposes.91 Thus, unlike with public schools,
whose tax exemption is secure, a postgraduate training program operated
within a private school could potentially put the school’s tax exemption at
risk, in addition to raising UBIT questions.92
As before, a program operated without any separate legal structure or as
a single-member LLC is simply considered a law school activity,93 and the
program would derive its tax exemption directly from the law school because
it is the law school. As Professor Colombo has noted, it seems highly unlikely
that a program’s activities would threaten a law school’s tax-exempt status.94
To do so, the program would have to constitute a substantial non-exempt
purpose. Assuming the program is designed with training lawyers as its
primary goal, it seems unlikely that the program would be deemed a separate,
non-exempt purpose. In contrast, a program designed to beneﬁt individuals,
such as the supervising attorneys, could be deemed a non-exempt purpose.
However, it seems unlikely that such a program would be deemed substantial
given the relative size of most law schools, whether measured by revenue,
89.

Any law school considering operating a program within the law school that has issued
tax-exempt bonds should also examine whether the operation of such a ﬁrm could cause
problems for its tax-exempt bond status under Code Section 145.

90.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).

91.

See Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).

92.

C.f. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974 (reviewing both exempt status and UBIT questions
as a result of a joint venture conducted by a university).

93.

The school could also consider entering into a joint venture with a for-proﬁt organization
in the form of an LLC. The LLC would not obtain exemption, but its activity would be
attributed to the law school. This could aﬀect its exempt status if too much private beneﬁt
accrues to the for-proﬁt partner, or create an obligation to pay UBIT on the venture’s
income. The IRS has approved this structure under certain conditions. See Rev. Rul. 98-15,
1998-1 C.B. 718; Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974. Among the charity’s responsibilities must
be the need to exercise control over matters that would aﬀect the venture’s exempt purpose.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; Rev. Rul. 2004-51. We do not consider the joint-venture
option further because we believe it presents unnecessary complications. For a thorough
analysis of the issues raised by joint ventures of nonproﬁt organizations, see MICHAEL I.
SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2007).

94.

Colombo, Tax Exemption Aspects, supra note 46.
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assets, employees, or hours worked. For the postgraduate training program to
endanger a law school’s tax exemption, the program would have to grow to a
mammoth size, such that revenue from the sale of legal services exceeded that
of the law school on a regular basis.95
More likely is that program proﬁts could be subject to UBIT. Professor
Colombo concludes that if the activity is conducted within the law school,
it is highly likely that it would be considered substantially related to the
law school’s exempt purpose and thus not an unrelated business activity.
However, we caution that, if the program were conducted without suﬃcient
regard to the educational mission, the activity could be deemed unrelated to
the school’s educational mission. The prudent law school should adopt clear
rules to ensure that the educational mission dominates, as discussed below in
our recommendations in Part IV.C.4. Even if the IRS were to determine UBIT
applied, the ruling would not have a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial impact because such
programs are unlikely to turn a proﬁt and consequently should owe little if
any tax.
C. Stand-Alone Postgraduate Training Programs
1. Qualify for 501(c)(3) Status Under Current Guidance
Qualifying a stand-alone program as a tax-exempt charity depends on the
type of entity formed. One possibility is to create the program as a singlemember LLC owned by an existing tax-exempt organization, such as a
freestanding alumni organization or university foundation. As noted above,
the LLC would generally be disregarded for tax purposes, unless it elected
to be taxed as a corporation. However, the aﬃliation could pose a number of
tax issues for the sponsoring organization. At the very least, the sponsoring
organization would be required to notify the IRS on its Form 990, but it
might also want to seek clariﬁcation from the IRS on its status to ensure
that the change did not threaten its exempt status.96 Multimember LLCs
95.

We discuss the legal standard and its application in greater detail in the context of standalone programs, where the fee-for-service aspect of programs looms much larger.

96.

Tax exemption letters from the IRS provide certainty regarding the activities disclosed to the
IRS in the application. An organization that signiﬁcantly changes its activities must provide
notice to the IRS on its Form 990. I.R.S., FORM 990 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf. However, such notice does not provide the organization any assurance from
the IRS that it remains in compliance with the exempt requirements. Before beginning to
operate the program, the organization may want to seek a private letter ruling from the IRS
to ensure that the new activity will not jeopardize its exempt status. See I.R.S., COMPLIANCE
GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES, PUB. 4221-PC at 23 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf. The organization could also choose to have the LLC apply separately
for exemption, but the LLC would no longer be disregarded, and we are back to our
argument below in Part IV.C. See I.R.S., IRS INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
REFERENCE SHEET 1-2, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/llc_guide_sheet_instructions.pdf
(last visited Nov. 24, 2015) (Part I, questions 1 & 2).
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present signiﬁcant diﬃculties and may not be worth the eﬀort.97 This leaves
nonproﬁt corporations as the best choice if tax exemption is to be sought.
Such organizations must qualify in their own right.
Postgraduate legal training programs that provide legal services to paying
clients do not ﬁt easily within categories of legal service organizations for
which tax exemption is readily available. Nonetheless, a path does exist that
is consistent with both the letter and spirit of current guidance. We believe
the path is narrow and will require constant vigilance on the part of those who
direct such programs. However, programs that have education as their primary
purpose and use appropriately scaled on-the-job training in a commercial
setting to accomplish this purpose should qualify under both the general
guidance on tax exemption and the speciﬁc guidance directed to charitable
organizations that provide on-the-job training.
a. False Starts
At ﬁrst blush, one might think that stand-alone postgraduate legal training
programs could qualify as tax-exempt under Code Section 501(c)(3) as a
qualiﬁed legal services organization or by virtue of the low-cost services they
provide to those who cannot aﬀord lawyers.98 If nothing else such programs
seem quite similar to medical residency programs, and one might think that
the rationale in the former context would work in the latter. Unfortunately,
none of these approaches provides a clear path to exemption.
First, most programs would not qualify as public interest law ﬁrms. The
IRS has deﬁned public interest work to be the type of work that for-proﬁt
ﬁrms will not take, typically because the private interests are insuﬃcient to
warrant hiring a lawyer.99 It has also generally limited public interest ﬁrms from
receiving more than ﬁfty percent of their support from fees charged to clients.100
97.

See note 93, supra. The Service allows LLCs to qualify as charitable organizations where they
meet a twelve-part test including that its only members are other charitable organizations or
government entities. See Richard A. McCray & Ward L. Thomas, Limited Liability Companies as
Exempt Organizations—An Update, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 2001,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf.

98.

IRS guidance clearly creates a path for four diﬀerent types of legal services organizations:
(1) legal aid organizations providing assistance to low-income individuals free or for a small
fee, (2) human and civil rights defense organizations, (3) public interest law ﬁrms, and (4)
organizations that attempt to achieve charitable goals through litigation itself. See Litigation by
501(c)(3) Organizations, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 1984. Programs
are not likely to ﬁt under the second and fourth categories.

99.

The IRS explained in Rev. Rul. 75-74, 1975-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154, that
private interests suﬃcient to warrant hiring an attorney suggest that no public interest
exists. More recently, the IRS has permitted public interest ﬁrms to charge fees, subject
to limitations, Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.05, 1992-2 C.B. 411, suggesting a broader view of public
interest. However, such ﬁrms must set their policies and programs through a committee
representative of the public interest.

100. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 4.05, 1992-2 C.B. 411. Initially ﬁrms were barred from seeking or accepting
attorneys’ fees from clients, Rev. Proc. 75-13 § 3.01, 1975-1 C.B. 662, but they were allowed to
accept fees paid by the opposing side or awarded by courts. Id. § 3.02. However, they could
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By design, most postgraduate training programs will seek to represent a mix of
low-income and middle-income parties in private disputes, making it unlikely
that the work done would count as public interest. In addition, most programs
will depend primarily on fees for support, violating the ﬁfty percent limit.101
Second, it seems unlikely that most programs will qualify as legal aid
organizations. Organizations that provide legal services to the indigent free or
at a nominal fee can qualify for tax exemption,102 and some programs may have
received tax-exempt status under this rule.103 However, the IRS has also held
that providing below-market goods or services to those simply unable to pay
market rates is not a charitable purpose under Code Section 501(c)(3) and could
indeed defeat tax exemption.104 In other contexts, the IRS has suggested that,
where a service is not “inherently charitable,” the service must be provided at
“substantially below cost” to obtain exemption.105 Organizations that provide
services to those beyond the poor or near-poor or that must survive on the
fees they charge clients seem unlikely to qualify.106 It is possible that the IRS
not consider the likelihood of fee recovery in their decision whether to take a particular
case. Id. § 3.03. See also Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154 (ruling that a fee award cannot be a
substantial motivating factor in the decision to take a case). The IRS liberalized the rules in
1992 and now permits ﬁrms to charge their clients. However, they cannot charge more than
their actual costs. Rev. Proc. 92-59 § 5.01. Nor may they withdraw from a case if the client
cannot pay. Id. § 5.02.
101. The ﬁfty percent rule formally applies only to public interest law ﬁrms, and if the IRS
wished to promote low-bono ﬁrms it could create a diﬀerent rule for such ﬁrms and expand
on the notion of what constitutes a legal aid organization.
102. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-2 C.B. 177 (advising that legal organization that represents indigents
and charges fees based upon each indigent’s ability to pay is operated for a charitable
purpose). See also, Rev. Rul. 72-559, 1972-2 C.B. 247 (advising that providing subsidies to
recent law graduates to establish practices in economically depressed communities does not
jeopardize tax-exempt status).
103. Such organizations likely received private letter rulings from the IRS, which are applicable
only to their particular facts and circumstances and have no precedential value.
104. Rev. Rul. 73-127, 1973-1 C.B. 221 (ﬁnding that the sale of groceries to the poor at belowmarket prices was not an exempt purpose); Fed’n Pharm. Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 67
(1979), aﬀ’d, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (ﬁnding that a pharmacy that sold drugs at cost to
the elderly and the handicapped did not qualify for exemption).
105. See IRC 501(c)(3)—Substantially Below Cost, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC.
TEXT, 1986, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich86.pdf (indicating that ﬁfteen percent
of cost qualiﬁes as substantially below cost); Rev. Rul. 71-529, 1971-2 C.B. 234.
106. We note that in both the medical and educational contexts, charitable organizations
provide services at market rates to all comers, suggesting that there should be room for
other types of organizations to do so without risking their tax-exempt status. Indeed, in the
housing context, the IRS has allowed the sale of services or goods to the poor and middle
class combined, so long as substantially all of those receiving the housing are low-income
individuals. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115; Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717 (providing
safe harbor for low-income housing assistance organizations set up to assist low- and
moderate-income residents if seventy-ﬁve percent of the units are occupied by families who
are low-income (meaning eighty percent of the median local income)). Compare, however,
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has changed the norm for legal assistance organizations. However, it is not
apparent from the published guidance.
Whether providing low-bono services alone should qualify as an exempt
purpose is beyond the scope of this Article. However, if the IRS is taking
a broad view of what qualiﬁes as a legal aid organization, it should publish
guidance that clearly sets forth the requirements for qualifying as a legal aid
organization, thereby clearing up any uncertainty or confusion.
Finally, the rationale covering nonproﬁt hospitals and medical residency
programs is not a clean ﬁt because it is based on the provision of medical
services. Much like legal training programs, medical residency programs train
recent graduates, whom they pay, while providing services to a wide range of
patients and charging market rates for the services they provide. However,
the justiﬁcation for exempting medical resident programs does not appear
primarily to be the educational function served. Instead, the provision
of medical services is charitable because operated for the beneﬁt of the
community.107 As the IRS recognized in Revenue Ruling 69-545, promoting
health for the beneﬁt of the community has long been recognized a charitable
purpose even when not necessarily strictly directed toward the interests of the
poor. Whether right or not, providing legal assistance is simply not seen as an
inherently charitable activity, and a training program for such an operation
must take a diﬀerent path to exemption.108
Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-1 C.B. 915, in which the IRS appears concerned about whether
signiﬁcant private beneﬁt is involved in these types of transactions.
107. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (ﬁnding that a nonproﬁt hospital qualiﬁes for exemption
where it operates for the beneﬁt of the community by (1) maintaining a community board, (2)
providing services to all in the community who can pay, and (3) operating an emergency room
open to all, including those who cannot pay). The primary distinction between a for-proﬁt
and a nonproﬁt tax-exempt hospital for some time has been the non-distribution constraint
imposed on tax-exempt hospitals. Although Rev. Rul. 69-545 noted that an emergency room
open to all was an important factor in justifying the exemption, the Emergency Medical
and Labor Treatment Act of 1986 (Section 1867(a) of the Social Security Act) imposed that
obligation on all hospitals. The Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act imposed new
rules on tax-exempt hospitals that provide a bit more distinction between these two types of
organizations. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Section 501(r) requires tax-exempt
hospitals to perform a community health needs assessment, adopt ﬁnancial assistance, new
billing, and collection policies, and limit charges to patients. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2012).
108. The closest analogue within the medical context for postgraduate legal training programs
is faculty group practice organizations. See Hugh K. Webster, Tax-Exempt Organizations:
Operational Requirements, 451-1st, TAX MGMT PORTFOLIOS—EST., GIFTS & TR. SERIES (BNA)
(2015). These are groups of medical school faculty employed in part by a hospital or higher
education institution, but incorporated pursuant to a state law as a group of doctors engaged
in private practice. The practice bills patients and pays the doctors an amount in addition
to any base salary from the university or hospital. The doctors typically teach and train
medical residents as part of their private practice. The IRS originally refused to grant these
practice groups exemption because they believed the doctors received too much private
beneﬁt; but the IRS lost a series of cases in the 1980s, and it now generally recognizes such
practices as exempt as long as they follow fairly strict guidelines. Univ. Mass. Med. Sch.
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b. Education With On-The-Job Training as the Path to Exemption
Despite the false starts described above, current guidance oﬀers two paths
to tax exemption for postgraduate legal training programs. One possibility
is that law school-aﬃliated programs could be granted exemption because
they advance the mission of their aﬃliated schools. The other is that such
programs advance education in their own right, even if they don’t look like
traditional educational institutions. This latter approach paves the way for
non-law school-aﬃliated programs.
i. Indirect Exemption
The IRS has held that organizations that provide commercially available
services can receive tax exemption if they advance the interests of an exempt
educational institution.109 For instance, the IRS has granted tax exemption
to college bookstores,110 dorms,111 cafeterias, and restaurants,112 as well as to
providers of scholarships and low-interest loans to college students.113 It has
also found that a separately incorporated non-university-controlled alumni
association that raises funds for university programs, engages in public
relations work on behalf of the university, publishes an alumni magazine, and
supervises the sale of football tickets allotted to alumni is exempt from tax
because substantially all of its activities aid education.114
Relatedly, the IRS has suggested that exempt organizations can create
separate entities over which they have substantial control and seek exemption
Grp. Practice v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1299 (1980), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 2; B.H.W. Anesthesia Found.,
Inc. v. Comm’r., 72 T.C. 681 (1979), nonacq., 1980-2 C.B. 2. The rationale for granting these
programs tax-exempt status seems to be that they are an integral part of the exempt entity
they are associated with and that they promote health. While not directly on point, these
authorities suggest that commercial activities can be aﬃliated with charitable organizations,
where the commercial activity is closely associated with the teaching mission.
109. These rulings seem closely connected to the integral part doctrine discussed above in Part
IV.B. For a discussion of this theory, see Roderick Darling & Marvin Friedlander, Virtual
Mergers Hospital Joint Operating Agreement Aﬃliations, I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L
EDUC. TEXT, 1997, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj97.pdf. However, the rulings
and holdings do seem to stand on their own, supporting the idea of an independent ground
for allowing exemption.
110. Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951).
111.

Rev. Rul. 76-336, 1976-2 C.B. 143 (ﬁnding that nonproﬁt corporation that provides housing to
students at college advances education and thus is operated for a charitable purpose under
§ 501(c)(3) where (1) neither the community nor the college is able to provide adequate
housing, (2) the organization consults with the college, and (3) the corporation locates the
housing near the college).

112. Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (ﬁnding that a corporation “organized for the purpose of
operating a book and supply store and a cafeteria and restaurant on the campus of a State
university primarily for the convenience of its student body and the members of its faculty
. . . operated exclusively for educational purposes.”).
113.

Rev. Rul. 63-220, 1963-2 C.B. 208.

114. Rev. Rul. 60-143, 1960-1 C.B. 192.

Postgraduate Legal Training: The Case for Tax-Exempt Programs

491

under the integral part theory, which is similar to that discussed above in the
context of public schools.115 In a non-precedential statement, the IRS stated
that an existing exempt organization must exercise “suﬃcient control and
close supervision . . . to establish the equivalent of a parent and subsidiary
relationship,” and that the organization seeking exemption “must perform
essential services that if performed by the exempt organization itself would
not be an unrelated trade or business.”116
None of the cases cited above involves an organization similar to the
postgraduate legal training program described here. Nonetheless, postgraduate
legal training programs will support their aﬃliated law schools and advance
their goal of producing well-trained lawyers. Such activities would not likely
be viewed as unrelated if carried on within the schools. Accordingly, despite
commercial overtones, the IRS could use this line of authority to grant tax
exemption to a postgraduate training program closely aﬃliated and supervised
by a related law school.
ii. Direct Exemption
The more direct approach focuses on the educational eﬀorts of the programs
themselves. A properly designed program should qualify under the general
guidance for Code Section 501(c)(3) and the speciﬁc guidance addressing
charitable organizations that provide on-the-job training. The key to this
approach is to ensure that any commercial activity is clearly “in furtherance of”
the programs’ educational purpose and is properly scaled to that purpose. We
start with the general rules before moving on to the more speciﬁc guidance.
a. General Guidance
Code Section 501(c)(3) aﬀords tax exemption to organizations that pursue
educational purposes. Educational purposes include “[t]he instruction
or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing
his capabilities . . . .”117 Code Section 501(c)(3) also permits exemption for
organizations that pursue charitable purposes. Advancement of education is
included as a charitable purpose and therefore serves as a separate ground for
exemption.118 Even though postgraduate training programs are not traditional
schools, for which exemption is readily available,119 they clearly pursue
115.

See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-41, 1978-1 C.B. 148 (ﬁnding that a malpractice trust “serving as a
repository for funds paid in by the hospital, and by making payments at the direction of the
hospital” operates as an integral part of the hospital and is therefore tax-exempt under Code
Section 501(c)(3)).

116. Darling & Friedlander, supra note 109.
117.

See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv)(2) (as amended 2008).

118. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d).
119. Schools typically maintain a regular faculty and have a curriculum and a regularly enrolled
student body. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(A)(ii) (2012). They also typically charge tuition and award
degrees. The examples provided in the Treasury regulations include “a primary or secondary
school, a college, or a professional or trade school.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii).
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educational purposes and advance education.120 The question will be whether
the commercial activity through which the on-the-job training is accomplished
will somehow defeat exemption.
To qualify for charitable status, an organization must be organized and
operated “exclusively” for charitable purposes.121 However, in construing the
operational side of that test, the regulations interpret the term “exclusively”
to require only that the organization be operated “primarily” for an exempt
purpose.122 Under this standard, organizations are ineligible for tax-exempt
status if a “more than insubstantial portion” of their activities is in pursuit of
a non-exempt purpose.123
Selling goods and services to paying customers, even at a discount, is not
an exempt purpose, and therefore otherwise charitable organizations typically
cannot be exempt if those activities are substantial. In such cases, the IRS will
deny an organization exempt status because the organization has a “substantial
commercial purpose.”124 Two bits of related law and guidance complicate
To be clear, not all educational institutions are granted tax exemption. Organizations
that violate public policy are not entitled to tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Moreover, where a school serves a private as opposed to
a public interest, tax exemption is not permitted. Thus, if McDonald’s created McDonald’s
U to train new employees, tax exemption would be inappropriate. John D. Colombo, Why
Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 847 (1993).
120. Although not precisely on point, the IRS has found that an organization providing funds
for an on-the-job legal learning experience “advances education by supporting the training
of individuals for the purpose of improving or developing their abilities.” Rev. Rul. 78-310,
1978-2 C.B. 173. This ruling supports a broad reading of educational purpose that should
encompass providing training directly. Also, the IRS has approved an apprenticeship
program established as a joint project of labor and management. Rev. Rul. 67-72, 1967-1 C.B.
125; see also Rev. Rul. 72-101, 1972-1 C.B. 144 (approving the establishment of a school by labor
and management to train employees).
121. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
123. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). This interpretation likely comes from the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Better Bus. Bureau v. U.S., 326 U.S. 279 (1945), of a related statute found in the
Social Security Act. See Philip Hackney, A Response to Professor Leﬀ’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for
Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. (2014).
124. See, e.g., Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (aﬃrming U.S. Tax Court
decision that Living Faith’s activities operating a health food restaurant demonstrated a
“substantial commercial purpose” such that it did not qualify for tax exemption). See
also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 51-52 (2005). See also Goldsboro Art League v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 337, 338 (1980), in
which the IRS informed the taxpayer, which ran a museum and provided art education in
the community and also sold some of the art: “You are not operated for any exempt purpose
within the meaning of Sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2). You are operated in furtherance of
a substantial commercial purpose. Further you serve private rather than public interests.”
The court reversed the IRS because it found that the organization operated primarily for
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the analysis. First, the regulations create an exception if the commercial
activities are “in furtherance of” an organization’s exempt purpose. However,
the organization cannot be organized primarily to carry on such activities.125
Second, in 1950, Congress enacted the UBIT, which imposes a tax on a
charitable organization’s unrelated business income. This implicitly allows
organizations to carry on some quantum of an unrelated trade or business and
to engage in any amount of a related trade or business, so long as it does not
become a primary purpose.
To determine whether postgraduate training programs with signiﬁcant onthe-job training aspects qualify for exempt status, we must ﬁrst understand
what “in furtherance of” means. One possibility, and one that would give the
law coherence, is that the “in furtherance” requirement has the same deﬁnition
as used in the UBIT context, that is, the activity must bear “causal relationship”
and “contribute importantly” to the organization’s exempt purpose.126
Another possible interpretation of “in furtherance of” is that the activity will
be deemed in furtherance of exempt purposes if it generates revenues that are
used to support such purposes.127 This is often referred to as the “destination
of income” test, and the inquiry focuses on whether the charitable support
from an otherwise unrelated business activity is commensurate with the
business activity.128 We believe that Congress makes clear via the UBIT and
Code Section 502 that operating a business to generate revenue to support a
charitable cause cannot be considered “in furtherance of” an exempt purpose.
However, we oﬀer it here for completeness.
We must also determine when a business activity will be deemed an
organization’s “primary” purpose. Authorities have denied exemption where
business interests dominate, by what is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of
“commerciality.” For instance, a company organized to improve the quality of
Sunday school texts, but which had expanded its oﬀerings and accumulated
educational purposes. Id. at 345. The sale of paintings did not rise to the level of primary
purpose. Id. at 342. The regulations do not describe what constitutes primary or substantial,
which creates some uncertainty and puts signiﬁcant pressure on the exceptions. Id. at 346.
125. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (as amended 2008). As the Tax Court noted in Goldsboro, 75
T.C. at 343, “[a]n organization may engage in a trade or business as long as its operation
furthers an exempt purpose and its primary objective is not the production of proﬁts.”
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended 1983).
127. The Supreme Court set this standard in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). See also,
Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186 (granting exempt status to organization that operated a
commercial real estate rental business to fund charitable activities).
128. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-182 (granting exempt status to an organization that operated a
commercial real estate rental business to fund charitable activities). Under this theory,
a business that generates signiﬁcant revenues, only a small portion of which are used to
support charity, will not be deemed in furtherance of charitable purposes. See, e.g., I.R.S.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,682 (Nov. 17, 1971). Similarly, where a business fails to produce
signiﬁcant revenues to support charity, it will be deemed not to be in furtherance of charity,
thus thwarting tax exemption. See, e.g., id. at 23-24.
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over $1.6 million in net earnings from the sale of books, lost its exemption
because the authorities found that its primary purpose became the sale of
books rather than the advancement of education or religion.129 In other words,
if the organization looks more like a commercial enterprise than a charity,
and especially if the activity is loosely related to the exempt purpose, the
organization will be deemed to be primarily engaged in commercial activity,
thus precluding exemption.130
Finally, there is the issue of “private beneﬁt.”131 Organizations that beneﬁt
private as opposed to public interests are typically denied exemption. For
instance, in Ginsberg v. Commissioner, the Tax Court found an organization
that dredged a private waterway for the sole beneﬁt of the donors to the
organization provided so much private beneﬁt that the organization was
not operated primarily for an exempt purpose.132 More recently, the Tax
Court found the American Campaign Academy, which trained individuals
or candidates who intended to advocate only for Republicans, was not
primarily operated for an exempt purpose.133 Courts and the IRS recognize
that all nonproﬁt organizations beneﬁt some private interests. The question is
whether the organization is operating more than “incidentally for the purpose
of beneﬁting the private interests.”134
129. See, e.g., Scripture Press Found. v. U.S., 285 F.2d 800, 805 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
985 (1962) (ﬁnding based on evidence of signiﬁcant growth of sales that the “sale of religious
literature is its primary activity and that its instructional phase is incidental thereto.”). But
see Presbyterian & Reformed Publ’g Co. v. Comm’r, 743 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1984) (upholding
the exempt status of the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. in a seemingly similar
situation).
130. See, e.g., B.S.W. Grp. Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978) (ﬁnding that a purportedly
nonproﬁt consulting group looked too much like a for-proﬁt consulting group to qualify as
tax-exempt).
131.

The basis for this requirement appears to be Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended
2008). Private beneﬁt is similar to private inurement and often confused with it. Private
inurement occurs where net earnings of an organization inure to a private shareholder or
individual. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Private beneﬁt is a broader concept that focuses on
the beneﬁciaries of the organization’s activities. Examples of private inurement include
excessive salaries. Private inurement should not pose a problem for postgraduate training
programs. For a discussion of private beneﬁt, see John D. Colombo, Private Beneﬁt: What
Is It—and What Do We Want It To Be?, NAT’L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & THE LAW ANNUAL
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (2011), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/
JohnColomboFormattedNCPLPaper2011.pdf; Andrew Megosh, Mary Scollick, Mary Jo
Salins, & Cheryl Chasin, Private Beneﬁt Under IRC 501(c)(3), I.R.S. EXEMPT ORGS. CONTINUING
PROF’L EDUC. TEXT, 2001, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich01.pdf.

132. 46 T.C. 47 (1966).
133. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
134. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 377
(1980) (ﬁnding that, even though the organization in question sold paintings and remitted
eighty percent of the sale proceeds to the artists, the organization served a public purpose by
primarily promoting art education and only incidentally served the artists’ private interests).
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Under these standards, postgraduate training programs should be granted
exemption if properly designed. Certainly, the classroom and practical
training aspects of stand-alone programs support a claim that their purpose
is educational. The questions are (1) whether providing legal services to
paying clients is “in furtherance of” the exempt educational purpose, (2) if
not, whether it is a substantial non-exempt purpose, (3) whether it rises to the
level of “primary” purpose, and (4) whether it creates a private as opposed to
public beneﬁt.
As noted above, there are two possible ways to construe “in furtherance
of.” The ﬁrst uses a deﬁnition similar to that used for UBIT, namely that the
business activity must bear a “substantial relationship” to the organization’s
exempt purpose.135 The program’s exempt purpose is to train new lawyers.
Providing legal services to fee-paying clients will contribute to this goal
because it is the best way for new lawyers to gain the experiences necessary
to develop their practice skills. Providing legal services is a necessary means,
not an independent end,136 and therefore should be viewed as in furtherance
of that goal.
Postgraduate legal training programs would face greater diﬃculty under
the destination of income test because they are not designed to generate
income. The IRS has ruled that an organization will fail this test if (1) the
business activity does not generate funds to be used for exempt purposes,
or (2) it generates signiﬁcant income, but only a small amount is used for
charitable purposes.137 Ironically, under this standard, a program focused on
making money would be more likely to be considered “in furtherance of” an
exempt purpose than one designed to provide training. We think this would
be an odd reading of the statute, especially in a case like this one, where the
business activity is so clearly linked to the exempt purpose.
If providing legal services to paying customers is deemed in furtherance of
the exempt purpose, as we believe it should be, the activity should not be seen
to be a primary purpose. If it is deemed not to further a program’s exempt
purpose, in most cases the activity will be large enough to be considered a
substantial non-exempt purpose, thus thwarting tax exemption.
Finally, postgraduate legal training programs do not appear to pose
signiﬁcant private beneﬁt issues. The programs will not be preparing
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended 1983).
136. This contrasts sharply with cases where the IRS and courts have rejected claims that
commercial activity was in furtherance of an exempt activity. See, e.g., Senior Citizen Stores,
Inc. v. U.S., 602 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1979). In Senior Citizen Stores, the taxpayer operated a number
of secondhand stores and argued that they served the charitable purpose of aiding the
elderly. The court held that the retail activity appeared to be an end in and of itself and not
a means of accomplishing the charitable goal of assisting the elderly. Id. at 711. In particular,
the court noted that “less than half [the organization’s] employees were over the age of 55,
and their training was restricted to the needs of plaintiﬀ’s business. Plaintiﬀ conducted no
training program beyond the training of employees for its own shops.” Id. at 713-14.
137.

See supra note 128.
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new attorneys for a speciﬁc ﬁrm, as would be the case of the hypothetical
McDonald’s University, or the American Campaign Academy.138 The IRS
could assert that a given program is operated for the private beneﬁt of the
supervising attorneys members, as it did in the faculty medical practice group
context.139 To avoid this problem, care should be taken not to compensate
attorneys based upon the return from the cases they bring in. The IRS could
also assert that the programs operate for the beneﬁt of the clients. However,
on-the-job training cannot proceed without clients, and this would doom all
such enterprises.
b. Specific Guidance—On-The-Job Training Programs
Postgraduate training programs need not rely on the general legal rules to
support the claim that they deserve tax exemption. A number of authorities
hold that organizations with on-the-job training in commercial settings
can qualify for tax-exempt status so long as the training is in service, and
appropriately scaled, to an exempt purpose. For instance, in Rev. Rul. 73-128,
the IRS approved tax-exempt status for an organization that operated a toymaking business as a vehicle to train unskilled persons who were unable to
ﬁnd good jobs.140 The organization at issue operated a number of community
programs, including remedial reading and language skills classes, general
counseling services, and a job-training program. Participants in the training
program were paid to make toys, which were sold to the public via regular
commercial channels. Some participants worked in management roles. The
positions were not permanent. Rather, the goal was to place them in permanent
jobs as soon as they were adequately trained. Income earned through the sale
of the toys was used to fund other community services, and any shortfalls were
covered by public contributions.
The IRS noted that the sale of products is not a charitable purpose, whereas
the provision of vocational training to the unskilled and underemployed was,
so long as the manner of doing so was otherwise charitable. The question
was whether the business operation was an end in and of itself or instead the
means by which the organization accomplished its charitable purpose. The
IRS concluded that the toy-making operation was a means to a charitable
end based on the clear and distinct causal relationship between the activity
and the training objective. Moreover, the scale of the toy-making activity was
appropriate to the level of training being provided.
In contrast, Rev. Rul. 73-127 involved an organization that operated a
grocery store and spent only four percent of its revenues on training the “hardcore unemployed.” The rest of its operations were aimed at selling food at a
discounted price to the poor. The IRS found that selling discounted food
to the poor was not a charitable purpose, while helping the unemployed
138. Supra note 133.
139. See supra note 108.
140. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222.
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was. It also found that on-the-job training in commercial enterprises was
an appropriate way to fulﬁll that purpose. However, because the grocery
operation was substantially larger than necessary to carry out its charitable
training mission, the IRS denied the organization tax-exempt status, ﬁnding
that selling discounted groceries was a substantial non-exempt purpose.
Organizations that mix a charitable purpose with on-the-job training in
commercial settings are becoming increasingly popular. For instance, Juma
Ventures in San Francisco is dedicated to helping at-risk youth. It used to
operate a number of Ben & Jerry’s franchises, which it used to train its clientele
in basic skills such as counting change, getting to work on time, etc., so that
they can move on to jobs at for-proﬁt organizations.141 It now has relationships
with sports stadiums to do similar work.142 The Delancey Street Foundation in
San Francisco is dedicated to helping the homeless. It operates a restaurant
that it uses to train its clientele in the hopes that they will be able to ﬁnd
work elsewhere.143 A number of partnerships between charities and for-proﬁt
businesses have also sprung up to create training opportunities for the
disadvantaged.144
We believe that a well-designed postgraduate legal training program
ﬁts within these authorities and examples. The fee-for-service aspect of the
program is speciﬁcally designed to train the resident attorneys in the skills
they will need. It will also be scaled to the educational purpose. If the program
is properly designed, resident attorneys will work on every matter handled.
Every senior attorney in the program will supervise resident attorneys. Thus,
such programs should ﬁt easily within Rev. Rul. 73-128 and avoid the pitfall
described in Rev. Rul. 73-127 and in Senior Services, Inc.145
Some may believe that a training program for lawyers can be distinguished
from those described in the precedents based on diﬀerences in the capabilities
and salaries of lawyers, compared to those in the precedents. In particular,
the exempt purposes served by the on-the-job training programs discussed in
the guidance involve helping the poor. However, nothing in the precedents
suggests that on-the-job training is appropriate only when helping the poor.
Rather, they focus on the relationship between the training and the exempt
141. For more information about Juma Ventures, see JUMA, http://www.juma.org (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015).
142. See Juma Ventures Announces New Job Creation Program in New Orleans, SOC. ENTER.
ALL., (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.se-alliance.org/member-news/juma-ventures-announcesnew-job-creation-program-in-new-orleans.
143. For more information about the Delancey Street Foundation, see Welcome to Our Delancey Street
Website, DELANCEY ST. FOUND., http://www.delanceystreetfoundation.org/ (last visited Nov.
23, 2015).
144. See Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Proﬁt/Nonproﬁt Border, 118 PENN ST. L. REV.
489 (2014) (describing a number of partnerships between for-proﬁt companies and public
charities).
145. See supra note 136.
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purpose.146 Organizations that train lawyers in practical skills, including law
schools and continuing legal education providers, can be tax-exempt because
of their educational purpose.147 It would be a strange rule that prohibited all
on-the-job training in an educational context. We believe that same principle
should hold here.
Before moving on to the UBIT analysis, we make one more point about the
clientele the program will serve. Were the program’s exempt purpose to serve
the poor, the fact that some clients will not be poor could be problematic.
However, where the sale of services or goods is properly tailored to accomplish
an exempt purpose, the IRS is willing to allow those services to be provided to
the middle class, even at market rates. The most obvious examples are hospitals
and educational institutions, but the IRS has accepted this possibility outside
of those two narrow ﬁelds. This was certainly the case in Rev. Rul. 73-128,
discussed above.
In Rev. Rul. 72-124, the IRS held that an organization that provided homes
for the elderly could be exempt even where the majority of those receiving
services can pay for the services.148 Similarly, the IRS has granted exemption to
an organization that provided loans to business owners in high-density urban
areas with signiﬁcant poverty and neighborhood blight in order to stimulate
economic development.149 The IRS noted that although some of the recipients
of the loans would not be members of a charitable class, the important thing
was that these individuals were “merely the instruments by which the charitable
purposes are sought to be accomplished.”
In the case of a postgraduate training program, serving the middle class is
actually important to the exempt mission. Training new attorneys to advise
businesses requires clients with businesses, which the poor by and large do
not own or operate. Nor are they likely to have the resources to retain lawyers
to perform this type of work, even at the reduced rates such programs will
charge. Expanding the client base beyond the poor is critical to the training
mission of producing practice-ready lawyers and can provide broad societal
beneﬁts, given the market’s failure to produce aﬀordable legal services.
2. UBIT
Assuming a program is granted tax exemption, the question arises whether
any income produced by on-the-job training can be considered “unrelated” to
the charitable mission, such that it will be subject to UBIT. As noted above,
the question of UBIT is important to whether the program is conducted
146. A number of revenue rulings have held that apprenticeship programs, which typically
involve work for clients, can be tax-exempt. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-272, 1877-2 C.B. 1919; Rev.
Rul. 67-72, 1967-1 C.B. 125.
147. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, http://www.nita.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
148. Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 I.R.B. 145 (1972). See also, Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194 (1979).
149. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 (1974).
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within law schools or outside, and whether the law school is public150 or
private. To qualify as an unrelated trade or business, an activity must meet
three requirements: (1) it must be a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on,
and (3) not substantially related to the organization’s exempt purpose.151 The
ﬁrst two requirements are not in question for postgraduate training programs,
leaving only the question of whether the activity is substantially related to the
program’s educational purpose.
While an organization’s tax exemption is not in question for this analysis,
an organization that engages primarily in substantially unrelated activities
will not qualify as a tax-exempt organization.152 The regulations under Code
Section 513 provide important guidance here, stating that “the size and extent
of the activities involved must be considered in relation to the nature and
extent of the exempt function which they purport to serve.”153 One example in
the regulations is quite instructive and mirrors the authorities discussed above
in the context of on-the-job training.154 The example involves an organization
that trains students for the performing arts and generates funds from the sale
of tickets to performances. The example concludes that the performances
contribute importantly to the accomplishment of the organization’s exempt
purpose. Accordingly, the income produced is from a substantially related
trade or business and not subject to UBIT.
The IRS relied on this reasoning in Revenue Ruling 80-296 when it approved
the sale of broadcast rights to collegiate sports games as a trade or business
substantially related to the educational purpose of college athletics. It found
that by exhibiting the game in front of a larger audience the organization
promoted the school’s educational purpose. In Revenue Ruling 76-94, the IRS
considered a business run by an organization dedicated to helping emotionally
disturbed adolescents. The organization operated a grocery store at which
many of the youth worked. Working in the store was an integral part of the
therapy and aﬀected other aspects of life at the residential facility. Students
were paid for their work and could use their salaries to defray the costs of their
stay. The IRS held that the activity was scaled to the organization’s exempt
purpose and therefore was not an unrelated trade or business.155
A postgraduate legal training program designed in accordance with the
principles described below in Part IV.B.5 should readily qualify as a related
business and thereby avoid UBIT.

150. I.R.C. § 513(a)(2) (2012).
151.

I.R.C. § 513 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended 1983).

152. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended 2008).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3).
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4), Ex. 1.
155. I.R.C. § 513 (2012).
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3. Private Foundation or Public Charity Status
Although not a matter of tax exemption, the postgraduate legal training
program must also consider whether it will be treated as a public charity or
as a private foundation.156 This issue is important because public charities
are provided much more latitude under the Code than private foundations.
As noted above, private foundations must distribute a certain percentage
of their income or assets for charitable purposes each year.157 The charitable
contribution deduction under Code Section 170 is much less generous for
donations to private foundations than to public charities.158 Additionally,
private foundations face a bevy of excise taxes on behavior, such as self-dealing,
excess business holdings, and a required demonstrated payout amount, that
are costly to monitor and could restrict optimal functioning.159
Public charities are given more latitude because they typically have a
broad public constituency, and Congress trusts that their activities are more
likely to be in the broad interests of the public. Schools, hospitals, churches,
and organizations that receive broad public support from fundraising are
considered public charities. Private foundations, on the other hand, typically
receive their support from one family or a few families.
Schools (educational organizations in the Code) are considered public
charities, but postgraduate legal training programs are unlikely to qualify
under this provision because they will not operate with a full-time faculty,
a curriculum, and a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students.160 Under
some circumstances, programs may qualify as public charities because they
receive a substantial part of their support from either a governmental unit or
from contributions of the public.161 Most likely, programs will qualify because
they receive more than one-third of their support from a combination of
contributions and grants and from the sale of goods or services, where the sale
of those goods or services qualiﬁes as part of their exempt purpose.162
Alternatively, they might attempt to qualify as a supporting organization
under section 509(a)(3). An in-depth discussion of supporting organizations

156. I.R.C. § 509 (2012).
157.

See Part IV.B.1, supra.

158. I.R.C. § 170(b) (2012).
159. See I.R.C. § 4941 (2012) (imposing a self-dealing excise tax on certain controlling persons of
a private foundation); I.R.C. § 4942 (2012) (imposing an excise tax on a failure to distribute
income; I.R.C. § 4943 (2012) (imposing an excise tax on excess business holdings).
160. Named organizations include churches, hospitals, and schools. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)
(2012); I.R.C. § 509(a) (2012).
161. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (2012).
162. I.R.C. § 509(a)(2).
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is beyond the scope of this Article.163 However, such organizations have
very close ties to the public charities they support, such that they, too, can
be considered public charities, much as organizations performing essential
functions for tax-exempt organizations may be considered exempt. Support
is generally established through interlocking boards and other provisions
designed to show the close connection and alignment of interests between the
public charity and its supporting organization.164 Any program seeking tax
exemption must consider how best to ensure that it falls on the public charity
side of the line.
4. A Model Postgraduate Training Program
Ideally, the IRS would issue clear guidance in the form of a revenue ruling
making clear that postgraduate legal training programs can qualify for tax
exemption and setting forth the parameters such programs must meet to
qualify. Designing the speciﬁcs of such guidance is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, it would need to address both the scope of the educational
activities required and the extent to which and at what price such programs
could serve clients beyond those typically served by legal aid organizations.165
In the interim, those creating postgraduate training programs must make
do with the guidance that does exist. While the current guidance does not
provide the certainty one might desire, at least the tax considerations are
consistent with both the educational and legal access goals most programs
will have. First and foremost, it is critical to establish an independent exempt
purpose, which in most cases will be educational. The clearly stated mission
of any such program should be to train young lawyers in the practical aspects
of lawyering. To be clear, a byproduct of this mission may be to provide free
or low-cost legal services to those currently unable to aﬀord lawyers. However,
unless the program provides free or mostly free services to the poor, this is
not the basis upon which we believe the postgraduate legal training program
can acquire tax-exempt status under current guidance. Care must be taken
163. For a discussion of supporting organizations, see Supporting Organizations Requirements and Types,
I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Proﬁts/Charitable-Organizations/SupportingOrganizations-Requirements-and-Types (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Some may think of the
supporting organization route as a method to obtain exemption. However, exemption for a
supporting organization must be independently established. Some may confuse the notion
of integral part discussed above in Part IV.B.
164. See id.
165. With regard to the latter, one possibility might be to follow California Corporation’s Code
Section 13406(b), which permits law ﬁrms to be nonproﬁt public beneﬁt corporations if they
meet certain conditions, including that seventy percent of their clients must be lower income
persons under the California Health and Safety Code, which is based on Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) guidelines. Such an approach would allow for a signiﬁcant
range of eligible clients, while ensuring that the program was not simply competing in the
regular legal market. CAL. CORP. CODE § 13406(b) (West 2015). Signiﬁcant care would be
needed to ensure that the rules create enough leeway for such ﬁrms to break even or at least
come close. Otherwise, such ﬁrms may face unsustainable ﬁnancial pressures.
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to ensure that providing legal services to middle-class individuals, even at
reduced rates, does not rise to the level of a substantial non-exempt or the
program’s primary purpose.
While it is important from a training perspective that the program’s onthe-job training be as similar to a for-proﬁt operation as possible, from a tax
perspective, care should be taken to distinguish the training activities from forproﬁt ﬁrms. The authorities taken as a whole reveal that organizations that look
too much like for-proﬁt entities will not be granted tax exemption, whatever
the doctrinal justiﬁcation may be.166 Only where commercial activities serve an
exempt purpose or are incidental to an exempt purpose is exemption allowed.
The following suggestions should strengthen the case for granting stand-alone
postgraduate training programs exempt status.
First, classroom education activities should be signiﬁcantly greater than
those found in for-proﬁt ﬁrms. Resident attorneys should be trained on a wide
variety of topics, including practical skills, such as how to take depositions,
draft contracts, and negotiate deals or settlements, and also cover the business
of law, including how to price matters, bill clients, organize ﬁles, and use
technology. Programs should consider forming close relationships with other
nonproﬁt organizations, such as the sponsoring law school or state bar, to
provide such training.
Second, care should be taken in the type of work selected. Work should not
only be suitable to new lawyers, but it should also have signiﬁcant pedagogical
value. For instance, simple divorces often require negotiations (both with the
client and the opposing side) and limited discovery, and lead to short trials, all
skills that young litigators need. Divorces can also often be completed within
a year, thus giving the resident attorneys a good view of a case’s life cycle.
In contrast, programs should probably avoid practices that consist mainly
of ﬁlling out forms, on the one hand, and overly complex matters requiring
signiﬁcant practice experience, such as reverse triangular mergers, on the
other hand. Instead, they should focus on practice areas that young lawyers
are likely to go into, such as family law, civil litigation, criminal defense, and
transactional matters.
Third, the demands on the resident attorneys should be less than those
found in for-proﬁt ﬁrms. Associates in such ﬁrms are often required to bill
2000 hours, leaving little time for classroom learning or serious on-the-job
mentoring. Resident attorneys should have billable expectations commensurate
with their expanded classroom obligations and the expectation that they will
be working closely with supervising attorneys who will treat each project as a
teachable moment and learning opportunity. This will ensure that the on-thejob training element is truly focused on education and scaled to that task.
Fourth, resident attorneys should be allowed to stay for no more than three
years, by which time they will have learned suﬃcient skills to be considered
166. See, e.g., B.S.W. Grp. Inc. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
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practice-ready. This ﬂips the for-proﬁt model on its head167 and mirrors the
training program described in Rev. Rul. 73-128, where paid trainees moved
on as soon as they developed suﬃcient skills to ﬁnd private-sector jobs. It
also ensures that new positions will open each year and make these programs
available to more new lawyers.
Fifth, the program should focus on areas or client groups that are not
currently served by for-proﬁt ﬁrms, to minimize the extent to which the program
competes with the private sector. While programs cannot focus exclusively on
the poor absent outside funding, they could focus on the elderly,168 minority
groups, or veterans, all of whom have signiﬁcant needs that are going unmet.
Although not necessary,169 the program should set rates below market to reach
these clients. Doing so strengthens the claim that the program is not competing
with for-proﬁt businesses, but rather is serving clients the market has left
behind. To be clear, we do not argue that providing low-cost legal services is
a charitable purpose under current rules, though if structured to serve a class
of citizens whose legal rights are going undefended, maybe it should be. If
such activities are disproportionate to the training needs of the educational
purpose, the ﬁrm could fail to obtain tax-exempt status. Nonetheless, it is
consistent with the idea discussed in the context of public interest law ﬁrms
that tax exemption may be appropriate for organizations that ﬁll market gaps.
Sixth, the program should not be designed to turn a signiﬁcant proﬁt.
Organizations that turn large proﬁts seem far more commercial than charitable,
even where the purpose of the activity is to advance an exempt purpose.170
Seventh, although the authorities permit charitable organizations to pay
market rate salaries,171 paying the resident and supervising attorneys salaries
commensurate with what public-sector lawyers make will further diﬀerentiate
the program from for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
Eighth, eﬀorts should be taken to connect the program to other exempt
organizations. For instance, it might be advisable to put leaders of legalfocused nonproﬁts, such as the state bar or community legal services, on the
organization’s board or use members of the school’s alumni organization
to provide the classroom training. Creating a tight connection between the
program and other tax-exempt organizations will highlight the program’s
nonproﬁt nature and may help it qualify as a supporting organization, for
purposes of qualifying as a public charity, if necessary.
167. As noted above, most ﬁrms lose money on associates during the ﬁrst few years and only reap
the beneﬁts of any training provided thereafter. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 I.R.B. 145.
169. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222.
170. See Scripture Press Found. v. U.S., 285 F.2d 800, 805 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985
(1962) (ﬁnding that earning proﬁts would be permissible under the destination of funds
deﬁnition of “in furtherance of,” if the excess revenues were used to support an exempt
purpose but that doing so might call into question the program’s primary purpose).
171.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
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Programs should also consider creating a community board that includes
individuals from the law school, the state bar, the court system, and important
community leaders, who can ensure that the organization is thinking broadly
about its mission and is focused on the community in which it operates. It
might also be advisable to conduct a regular community needs assessment
to determine how well it is fulﬁlling the legal and educational needs of its
community.172
Finally, and perhaps most important, the scale of the practice must be
proportional to the training need.173 Getting the scaling correct will avoid the
risk identiﬁed in Rev. Rul. 73-127 that the commercial activity through which onthe-job training occurs will be considered a substantial non-exempt purpose.174
The raison d’etre for the program must be to train lawyers, not to perform
legal work for clients. To ensure that this remains so, postgraduate training
programs should ensure that every experienced lawyer in the organization
is deeply involved in training the resident attorneys and that the resident
attorneys are involved in most, if not all, of the legal work being conducted.
IV. Conclusion
Over the past several years, a number of actors have begun to explore
diﬀerent ways to provide the practical training necessary for new lawyers.
While some are pushing for greater training within the law school curriculum,
we believe that postgraduate legal training programs make the most sense.
Such programs will provide a wide range of public beneﬁts, from training
new lawyers to helping address the lack of aﬀordable legal services for a vast
number of Americans.
In this Article, we explore a number of design concerns related to
postgraduate legal training, including the relative merits of incubator and
residency programs, whether such programs should be operated within law
schools or as stand-alone entities, and whether they can and should qualify for
tax-exempt status.
We conclude that a properly designed postgraduate legal training program
operated within a school should pose no problems for a school’s tax-exempt
status. Moreover, a properly designed stand-alone program should qualify for
tax exemption under current guidance, even though it does not ﬁt easily within
any existing categories for which tax exemption has routinely been granted.
That said, we believe that the IRS should issue speciﬁc guidance in this area
172. Congress recently imposed such a requirement on hospitals in Code Section 501(r). I.R.C.
§ 501(r) (2012).
173. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-128 (deeming a toy-making business that trained workers and sold the
output at market rates a means to a charitable end because there was a clear and distinct
causal relationship between the training and the charitable purpose). See also Rev. Rul.
76-94, 1976-1 C.B. 171; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4), Ex. 1 (as amended 1983) (discussing this
same issue in the context of UBIT).
174. The organization at issue in Rev. Rul. 73-127, 1973-1 C.B. 221, dedicated only four percent of
its revenues to training. Id. at 1.

Postgraduate Legal Training: The Case for Tax-Exempt Programs

505

in the form of a revenue procedure to provide much-needed certainty and
help facilitate the creation of such programs, an important step in addressing
the gap between what students learn in law school and what they need to be
practice-ready lawyers.

